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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
ALICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL




A. The White Rabbit
Alice Randall, an African-American woman, was ordered by a government
official not to publish her criticism of the romanticization of the Old South, at
least not in the words she wanted to use.  The official was not one of the many
in Congress and the Administration who share a romantic view of the Confed-
eracy.  It was a federal judge in Atlanta who told Randall that she could not
write her critique in the words she wanted to use—a judge enforcing copyright
law.  Randall is the author of a book called The Wind Done Gone.1  In it, she
tells a story that takes off from Gone with the Wind 2 from the perspective of
Scarlet O’Hara’s mulatto half-sister.  In 2001, more than fifty years after Marga-
ret Mitchell died, and years after the original copyright for the book would have
expired under the law in effect when Mitchell wrote it, a federal district judge
ordered Randall’s publisher not to publish The Wind Done Gone.  The Court of
Appeals then overturned the injunction as a prior restraint.3
B. Off with His Head!
Dmitry Sklyarov is a Russian programmer who faced the prospect of an
American jail because he wrote software that enables people to read books that
they are not allowed to read. Adobe Systems convinced the government to
prosecute Sklyarov because he made it possible for people to read documents
that Adobe had encrypted so that they could only be read with its eBook reader
program. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) makes it a crimi-
nal offense to provide software that lets people read digitized books with
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1. ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001).
2. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1939).
3. This subpart describes the facts of SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th
Cir. 2001).
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equipment that is not licensed to decrypt them.4  The DMCA does not exempt
people who write software that readers can use to read books that they are per-
fectly privileged to read.  It does not matter that the person who wants to read
the book owns a copy of it.  It does not matter that the person who wants to
quote from a book or a DVD wants to do so in a manner that is permitted un-
der copyright law, such as under the fair use doctrine.  It does not even matter if
the encrypted materials are in the public domain—like Alice in Wonderland.5
Adobe wanted to demonstrate how useful its eBook reader would be to
publishers who wanted to distribute their books digitally.  It used a digital book
that it could get cheaply—Alice in Wonderland.  The original text was in the
public domain.  Alice had already been digitized and proofread by volunteers as
part of Project Gutenberg.6  All that Adobe needed to do was take this free text,
wrap it in its digital code, and presto—Adobe had a cheap and effective demon-
stration of how its technology could help copyright owners.  The cover sheet of
the closed edition of Alice is immensely instructive.  It explains to the readers
that they may not give, lend, quote, or print out a copy of this public domain
work.7
C. What, Exactly, Is Your Problem?
Edward Felten is a computer scientist at Princeton.  As he was preparing to
publish a paper on encryption, he received a threatening letter from the
Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), telling him that publi-
cation of the paper constituted a violation of the DMCA.
The music industry had spent substantial sums developing encryption for
digital music distribution.  In order to test the system before it actually
entrusted music with this wrapper, the industry issued a public challenge, invit-
ing all cryptographers to try to break the code.  Felten succeeded in doing so,
but he did not continue to test his solutions because the industry required that,
to continue testing, he sign a nondisclosure agreement.  Felten is an academic,
not a businessperson.  He works to make knowledge public, not to keep it
secret.  He refused to sign the nondisclosure agreement and prepared to publish
his findings.  As he did so, he received the RIAA’s threatening letter.  In
response, he asked a federal district court to declare that publication of his
findings was not a violation of the DMCA.  The RIAA suddenly realized that
trying to silence academic publication of a criticism of the weakness of its
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).
5. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND (1865).
6. Project Gutenberg is an effort involving hundreds of volunteers who find books no longer cov-
ered by copyright, scan them, and proofread them so as to make them freely available on the web.  See
Project Gutenberg at http://www.gutenberg.net (last visited Sept. 9, 2002).
7. This subpart describes the facts of United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d. 1111 (N.D. Ca.
2002).  See also Robert Menta, Read an E-book to Your Child, Go to Jail?  MP3.NEWSWIRE.NET, Dec.
26, 2002, at http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2000/ebook.html.
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approach to encryption was not the best litigation stance, and it moved to dis-
miss the case on the understanding that it would never dream of bringing suit.8
***
This paper does three things.  First, it outlines the general framework of the
relationship between two constitutional provisions—Article I, Section 8, Clause
8 and the First Amendment—and Congress’s power to regulate the use of
information and cultural resources through the institutional form of exclusive
private rights.  Second, this paper explains why it is appropriate, as a normative
matter, to require close judicial scrutiny of congressional use of this particular
form of regulation.  Third, it identifies six specific pressure points currently
bearing on this framework.
II
GENERAL FRAMEWORK
Copyright law is defined by constant tensions between exclusive private
rights on the one hand and the freedom to read and express oneself as one
wishes on the other hand.  As a matter of economics, copyright represents a
tension between the advantages of market-based production of information and
cultural goods on the one hand, and the intrinsic limitations of property rights
as institutional solutions to the public goods problem of information production
on the other hand.  As a matter of political morality, copyright supports democ-
racy by grounding some types of expression in the market, independent of gov-
ernment patronage.  But in doing so, copyright imposes substantial risks of
harm to democracy and individual autonomy.9
These tensions are mediated by two constitutional provisions: Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Exclusive Rights Clause”),10 and the
8. Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.N.J. June 26, 2001) available at http://www.eff.org/
IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/.
9. The past decade has seen a growing literature critical of exclusive private rights along these
dimensions.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); James Boyle,
A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism For the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997); Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373
(2000); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws
and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853  (1991); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social
Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215
(1996); William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988);
Jessica Litman, Copyright Owner’s Rights and User’s Privileges on the Internet: Reforming Information
Law in Copyright’s Image, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587 (1997); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of
Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125 (1993); Eben Moglen, Anar-
chism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, 4 FIRST MONDAY 8 (Aug. 2, 1999) avail-
able at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html; Pamela Samuelson, Is Informa-
tion Property? 34 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 15 (1991); David Lange, Cyberspace and its
(Dis)Contents: The Future of an Illusion (published as part of the symposium collection prepared for
Yale Law School Symposium on Internet Policy Choices), available at http://webserver.law.yale.edu/
censor/lange.htm (April 1999).
10. U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This is also known as “the Patents and Copyrights Clause” or the
“Intellectual Property Clause.”  I think “the Exclusive Rights Clause” is better for two reasons, one
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First Amendment’s Speech Clause.11  Because of physical and economic charac-
teristics, existing information and culture are, absent law to the contrary, largely
available for anyone to use as and when they please.  For good reason and
within the constitutional constraints imposed by the two provisions, Congress
may deviate from this baseline.  No one expressed this more poetically than
Thomas Jefferson:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and
mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expan-
sible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement or
exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encourage-
ment to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
from anybody.12
The role of the Constitution is to delimit the contours of the grant of exclu-
sive rights and to constrain Congress’s power to regulate, in pursuit of “the will
and convenience of society,” the use of information and cultural materials.
The Exclusive Rights Clause operates as a threshold filter on congressional
attempts to create exclusive private rights in information.  Uncharacteristically
for Article I, much of its text is involved not in granting power, but in delimiting
it.  The preamble takes a specific stand on the theory underlying the American
approach towards exclusive rights in information.  Congress is empowered to
grant exclusive rights “To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”
Ours is a self-consciously utilitarian, not moral, theory of such rights, consistent
with the sentiments expressed in Jefferson’s letters and those more generally
prevalent at the time.13  The Supreme Court too has consistently interpreted the
Exclusive Rights Clause in a utilitarian way, holding that “the primary objective
trivial and one significant.  The trivial point is that neither the historical terms-of-art “patents” and
“copyrights”—well known at the time of the Constitution’s drafting—nor the anachronistic term
“intellectual property” are used in the clause.  The clause actually refers to granting “exclusive rights.”
There are two functional reasons for shifting our usage to the original term from either of the more
common terms.  First, it is broader than the technical terms, and it implies that the clause is intended to
govern all exclusive rights in information, not only those that formally are called patents or copyrights.
This is clearly the correct understanding of the scope of the limitations the clause places on Congress
when it enacts exclusive rights in information.  Second, it is more neutral about the desirability of the
rights enacted than the term “intellectual property.”  As we stand at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, “property” has come to be seen almost universally as a beneficial institutional device to
manage physical resources.  By calling the cluster of regulations of information production and
exchange that give private parties exclusive rights to control information “property,” we endow it with
an inevitability and desirability that are not justified by either economic theory or empirical evidence.
It is better to use the descriptive term—exclusive rights—and subject any given set of exclusive rights to
neutral inquiry as to whether these particular rights are in fact beneficial.
11. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
12. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966).
13. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background
and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1,
33-36 (1996).
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of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.’”14
For over a century, unanimous Supreme Court opinions have interpreted
the textual framework of the Exclusive Rights Clause as imposing a set of
threshold constraints on legislation it enables.  A congressional law creating
exclusive private rights in information must comply with these constraints to fall
within the grant of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.15 The Trade-mark Cases16 were
the first instance in which the Court held that the clause imposes affirmative
constraints on Congress’s power to create exclusive rights, but the Court most
clearly outlined the content of these constraints in Graham v. John Deere Co.:17
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the patent monop-
oly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to mate-
rials already available. 
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must “pro-
mote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.” This is the standard expressed in the Constitu-
tion and it may not be ignored.18
This reading of the Clause—that it requires an exclusive right to encourage
at least some information production and that it restrains such rights from
removing or burdening free access to materials already in the public domain—is
one that the Court has unanimously reaffirmed.19
14. As the Court said in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991):
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by others with-
out compensation.  As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this is not “some
unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.” Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S., 539, 589 (Brennan J., dissenting).  It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,”
ibid., and a constitutional requirement.  The primary objective of copyright is not to reward
the labor of authors, but “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” Art. I, § 8, cl.
8. . . .  To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encour-
ages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
Id. at 349-50.
15. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).  For discussions of
the limitations imposed by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, see Julie E. Cohen, Copy-
right and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1130-35 (1998); Theodore H.
Davis, Jr., Copying in the Shadow of the Constitution: The Rational Limits of Trade Dress Protection, 80
MINN. L. REV. 595, 596 (1996); David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary
Trademark Law: An Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to
Care, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 232 (1996); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause and the
First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 50-4 (1999); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional
Incontestability?: The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution:
Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 259, 260 (1995).
16. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
17. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
18. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
19. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-47; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
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Furthermore, this constraint is substantive, not formal.  It applies whenever
Congress attempts to enact exclusive rights in information, regardless of
whether it formally invokes the Exclusive Rights Clause.20  While Congress may
regulate information markets under the Commerce Clause, it may not do so by
creating exclusive private rights in information in a way that circumvents the
substantive limitations placed on its power by the Exclusive Rights Clause.  This
limitation requires that regulations enacted under the commerce power be dif-
ferent in kind, not only in subject matter and degree, from exclusive property
rights—like rights that are the subject of the Exclusive Rights Clause.21  This
does not mean, however, that every technical aspect of the Exclusive Rights
Clause—like the fixation requirement—constrains Congress when it acts under
the Commerce Clause.  Still, plainly “the Commerce Clause cannot be used [by
Congress] to eradicate a limitation placed upon Congressional power in another
grant of power,”22—such as the Exclusive Rights Clause.
The First Amendment operates as an overlay.  It provides a second level of
analysis for laws that pass the initial threshold filter imposed by the Exclusive
Rights Clause.  This First Amendment analysis is more context-sensitive.  It
requires that the government justify its regulation of the use of information and
cultural goods in terms that are largely understood to be the “intermediate”
level of scrutiny applied in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC.23  As was the
case with the must-carry rules at issue in Turner, copyright or similar laws are
usually benign in intent.  Their purpose is to enhance, rather than constrain,
speech.  They are, in many applications, content-neutral.  First, they mark
information or cultural materials for regulation on the basis of the history of
their origination—the fact that they were authored. Second, the form of the
regulation is usually a prohibition on use of the protected materials in a pre-
stated variety of ways, absent permission of an identified party, the right holder.
Not all applications of copyright law are content-neutral, however. One of the
current pressures on this general framework comes from the anti-device provi-
sion of the DMCA24—under which a number of current cases, including the
Sklyarov,25 Felten26, and Reimerdes/Corely27 cases, are being decided.  The anti-
20. See Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J.
535, 549 (2000).  The core of the argument is that what was left of the Sears and Compco cases by
Bonito Boats was a commitment to subject all legislation that is functionally equivalent to exclusive
rights to the limitations of the Exclusive Rights Clause.
21. This difference in kind is nowhere more clearly articulated than in the differentiation provided
by the Supreme Court between what kind of laws regulate commerce, and what kinds of laws are in
effect exclusive private rights.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157-59.
22. United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999) (treating the fixation
requirement as not central to the Exclusive Rights Clause, and holding that the anti-bootlegging statute
at issue there, which did not comply with the fixation requirement but was enacted under the Com-
merce Clause, was valid, and implying that were there another, central requirement of the Exclusive
Rights Clause, like originality, implicated, the outcome would have been different).
23. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
24. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a).
25. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Ca. 2002).
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device provision, as applied to software programmers, may better be described
as taking the form of a content-based prohibition on the use of a particular pro-
fessional language or code to describe acts that the government deems particu-
larly harmful—namely, decryption of specific kinds of encryption intended to
protect copyrighted materials.  For the moment, I will put this problem aside.  It
is a thorny one, and I will return to it in the third part of this paper.
To pass muster under the Turner standard, the government must show the
statute: (1) serves an important government interest, and (2) does so in a
manner no more restrictive than is necessary.28  To fulfill the first prong of the
test, it must be shown “that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural,
and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way.”29  The second prong requires that “the means chosen do not ‘burden sub-
stantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate
interests.’”30  This does not mean that in every case the specific use by the user
and the specific exclusive right claimed must be considered afresh, as demon-
strated by Harper & Row.31  It also does not mean that the contours of copyright
law—the exclusive rights and the various detailed political deals between
stakeholders—are categorically exempt from First Amendment review, as
recently held by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Eldred v.
Reno.32  Categorical exemption is untenable.  All one needs to do is imagine
Congress amending the Copyright Act so that the definition of “a work” will
include the sentence, “except that nothing shall be deemed a work of author-
ship if the author is at the time of authorship, or was within the preceding ten
years, a Republican member of Congress.”  If the viewpoint bias makes the
analogy too easy, imagine the same appellate court being confronted with a
copyright law that adds to Section 107 of the Copyright Act: “Any use of a work
is categorically a fair use if the copyright in the work is held, directly or indi-
rectly, by any person who holds the copyrights in more than 10% of the works
in the same market as the work used.”33  The Supreme Court in Harper & Row
refused to create a special First Amendment defense in copyright, “[i]n view of
the First Amendment’s protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by
26. Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.N.J. June 26, 2001) available at http://www.eff.org/
IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/.
27. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2001).
28. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 662.
29. Id. at 664.
30. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).
31. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
32. 239 F.3d 372, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1062,
and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
33. Compare the holding of another panel of the same court, within weeks of Eldred, in Time
Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001), of which more will be said
below.
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fair use . . . .”34  Nothing in that opinion suggests that if Congress were to abolish
the idea/expression distinction, or severely constrain “the latitude for scholar-
ship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use,” that its decision to do so
would be exempt from First Amendment review.
The contours of copyright law and the shape of the prohibitions must be jus-
tifiable under the Turner standard as a proper regulation of the use of the
information or cultural materials at stake.  This test is not only applicable to
changes in the law but also to existing rights as they are applied to categories of
cases.  Whether sampling for a few seconds35 or using part of a poster for a
number of seconds in a television show36 is or is not a fair use, at least when a
category of cases is being developed in case-law, requires an analysis of whether
fair use law, thus interpreted, would cohere with the First Amendment.
III
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN INFORMATION
What, one might ask, justifies such extensive judicial review of the creation
and definition of exclusive rights in information?  At some level, the answer is
provided by the stories at the beginning of this paper.  Alice Randall’s freedom
to shatter a cultural icon that she sees as profoundly offensive, in the words and
means she deems most effective, is no less compelling than Paul Cohen’s right
to criticize the draft using his particular locution.37  Dmitry Sklyarov’s physical
freedom is at stake.  It has been threatened so that no one develops software
that allows users and courts, rather than vendors, to decide when reading,
quoting, and sharing of knowledge is privileged and fair.  These freedoms, like
Edward Felten’s freedom to publish an academic paper, are all central to our
understandings of freedom of expression.  Randall, Sklyarov, and Felten pro-
vide crisp instances of the pressure that exclusive rights in information place on
the freedom to read and express oneself.  The next few pages explain more
abstractly how one might understand the implications of exclusive private rights
in information on democracy and autonomy—values at the core not only of the
U.S. constitutional protection of freedom of expression, but of expressive free-
dom in modern liberal democracies more generally.  
A. Democracy
Democracy is a concept with many conceptions.  It would be irresponsible
to argue that there is one well-defined set of policies that best serves democ-
racy.  Nonetheless, it is possible to outline the general direction in which strong
or weak exclusive rights are likely to lead the organizational structure of infor-
34. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
35. See, e.g., Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993).
36. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).
37. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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mation production and exchange. From this, one can develop a sense of
whether one’s conception of democracy leads to a preference for stronger or
weaker protection on the basis that it serves, or disserves, democracy.
The most important effect of exclusive rights, in terms of democracy, is that
they make institutional conditions more conducive for some approaches to
information production than to other approaches.38  Individuals with a commer-
cial focus to their work and, more significantly, commercial organizations that
build their business model around selling information and culture as finished
goods benefit from strong protection.  These rights are particularly helpful to
organizations that own large inventories of existing information and cultural
goods and that integrate new production with inventory management.  Strong
intellectual property rights are particularly harmful to organizations and indi-
viduals who produce information without intending to sell their output as a
good.  This includes non-profit organizations, such as universities, various
public interest organizations, the government, and individuals who communi-
cate with each other either as “amateurs” or as professionals driven by internal
motivations, not by a profit motive.  Less obviously, it also includes commercial
organizations and individual professionals that operate on a service model that
provides free access to information around which the service is rendered, rather
than the sale of information as a product.
The conflict seen today regarding the scope of the public domain and the
extent of exclusive private rights in information is a battle over the shape of the
institutional ecology in which two very different modes of information produc-
tion compete.  The first mode is the increasingly industrial model of production
that one sees in mass-mediated culture.  Disney, AOL Time-Warner, Viacom,
and News Corporation are some of the most visible examples.  These are
increasingly large organizations that control ever-larger inventories and inte-
grate new production with reutilization and recycling of inventory.  They aim to
capture ever-larger audiences both nationally and internationally.  Less well
known, and quite poorly understood, is the emergence on the Internet of non-
proprietary production as an increasingly important source of information and
cultural materials. Over the past decade, with the widescale use of the Internet,
the reach and scope of nonproprietary information production by nonprofit
actors or by individuals—both amateur and professional—has expanded dra-
matically.  
At a simple level, the Internet has made it possible for traditional non-profit
social organizations to extend their reach and scope.  In the past, the greatest
constraints on non-profit production were the capital cost of production and the
cost of communication, or distribution.  The declining costs of making and dis-
tributing a high quality video or of collecting information and publishing reports
exemplify the changes.  These changes mean that information production on
the public radio model, as well as production by other non-profit groups, can
38. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22
INT’L REV. L & EC. 81 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Intellectual Property].
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become increasingly salient in the information environment.  This possibility
must be central to our evaluation of the implications of strong rights to democ-
racy.
More obscure, but potentially much more radical, is the emergence of non-
proprietary peer production of information and culture. Thanks to the success
of open source development projects like GNU/Linux or Apache,39 this model
of production is increasingly recognized in the area of software development.  It
is less widely appreciated that this highly decentralized model of non-proprie-
tary peer production is expanding into other areas of information and culture
more generally.40  Tens of thousands of volunteers are mapping Mars craters
faster than images of the planet’s surface are produced.41  Almost 40,000 volun-
teers participate in creating the open directory project, the most comprehensive
and highest quality human judgment-based directory of the Web.42  Thousands
of peer reviewers and posters make contributions and write comments on
Slashdot, one of the most sophisticated peer-produced news sites.43  Through
many such groups of individuals, who come together to create and make sense
of their information environment, peer-production has emerged as a serious
antithesis to the industrial production model that dominated twentieth century
mass media.
When we think, therefore, of how strong we want copyright or other exclu-
sive rights to information to be, in terms of democratic theory, the most impor-
tant question is: What can democratic theory tell us about the choice between
commercial proprietary production, increasingly organized in large enterprises
and whose products are sold as finished goods, and nonproprietary production,
both peer-production and professional production on a traditional nonprofit
model?
The strongest democratic justifications of highly protective copyright serve
what Baker has described as the elitist conception of democracy44 and one ver-
sion of what might be thought of as a republican conception of democracy.
Strong protection is least attractive when measured by its effect on liberal con-
ceptions of democracy—whether one holds some version of a pluralist concep-
tion, or a liberal, rather than republican, discourse-centered conception of
democracy.45  Again, it is unlikely that conceptions of democracy can be
39. See generally GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION
(2001).
40. For an inspired statement, see Moglen, supra note 9.  For a pedestrian economic explanation
see Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 102 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
41. For more information about NASA’s Clickworkers experiment, see http://clickworkers.arc.
nasa.gov/top (last visited Oct. 7, 2002).
42. http://dmoz.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
43. http://www.slashdot.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
44. C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998).
45. This latter is a conception Baker called “complex democracy.”  Id. at 319.  One might think of
it as vaguely Habermasian, in the sense that it is discourse-centered but fundamentally liberal—
centered on the participating agents—rather than communitarian, or republican, and centered on
claims of the collectivity to independent weight in political morality.
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described in pure uni-dimensional terms. One’s position, however, on the rela-
tionship of exclusive private rights in information to democracy ought to be
informed by the extent to which one considers one or another of these ideal-
type conceptions of democracy as playing a greater role in one’s understanding
of how democracy is best conceived.
The baseline argument from democracy in favor of strong rights is that
dependence on government largesse or patronage tends to require authors,
media, and others to be solicitous to those who pay the piper.  Exclusive rights
create a basis in the market for expression so that professional writers and crea-
tors can be sustained, based not on the decisions of government officials or
patrons of the arts, but on the popular support of any non-trivial segment of the
consumer market for information and cultural products.  Copyright also pro-
vides incentives for creators to write more and thereby enrich the information
universe within which a democracy functions.46
There are two weaknesses to this argument for strong rights.  First, markets
for media products and information are rife with market failures that mean that
they will not actually reflect the political views of the constituency.47  Second,
strong exclusive rights tend to commercialize, concentrate, and, to an extent,
homogenize the information produced.48  They aid information-as-goods ven-
dors by raising the costs of, and potentially squelching, noncommercial dis-
course.
The argument for the importance of market-based production must there-
fore not only prefer market-based production to government-sponsored
production.  This is perhaps an easy choice for some—though, comparing net-
work television news and magazines, whether national or local, to public
television and radio should make one less than sanguine even about this claim.
The argument, however, must also prefer market-based production to peer-
production and independent nonprofit production.  This requires the argument
to take on a more explicitly elitist conception of democracy.  “True” democ-
racy—the participatory debate of all with all—is an illusion.  Large companies,
government officials, and other repeat players largely dominate the polity.  The
role of copyright is to create and sustain a large, powerful, and well-funded
watchdog in this system, one enabled by market power to participate in this
democracy of titans as an equal, criticizing the excesses of both government and
the corporate world.49  This conception has a good pedigree in the Press Clause
focus on the fourth estate, and it is not implausible if it accurately describes the
polity.  The elitist argument has two primary weaknesses.  First, it is unattrac-
tive to anyone who holds a more substantive, less cynical conception of democ-
46. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 11 (1994); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 288 (1996).
47. C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311 (1997).
48. Benkler, Intellectual Property, supra note 38.
49. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in our System of Free Expression,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1919-20 (2000).
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racy.  If democracy means something more than an oligarchy of large market
actors interacting with government bureaucrats who are watched by a large
commercial press with occasional elections in which the masses select from
among the elites who will run the government, then this argument in favor of
strong rights is insufficient to justify a preference for strong exclusive rights in
information.  Second, the argument fails to consider the rise of peer production
of information as a result of the economies created by low-cost computers and
fast, ubiquitous network connections.  The capacity of constituents to talk to
each other as opposed to receiving the wisdom of those anointed by the televi-
sion networks is profoundly important if one sees democracy as being about
active engagement in discourse, rather than about passive selection from an
exogenously-defined slate of candidates.  One needs only to run a search
request on Google50 and then follow the variety of individuals and organizations
making relevant information available, whether for free or for a fee, to see that
a conception that focuses purely on large scale industrial production of informa-
tion is too heavily committed to the twentieth century model of production by a
few corporations transmitting to millions of passive consumers.  Even without
resorting to a more aspiring conception of democracy, it is not at all clear that
thousands or millions of networked peers will not do as well or better than a
few hundred professional reporters or commentators can do.  An efficient
system that allows individuals to report what they see, to blow the whistle, and
to collect and comment on information globally, supplemented by a combina-
tion of publicly funded and advertising-supported (rather than property-based)
professional media may well be superior to a more concentrated and commer-
cial system that is occupied by a small number of media companies whose busi-
ness model is based on the sale of access to their products.
This, however, raises a second line of defense for concentrated commercial
production, which is rooted in a particular, nation-state focused version of a
“republican” conception of democracy.  Such a defense values polity-wide
common discourse toward reaching a conception of the common good as the
primary modality of democracy.  This is only a somewhat unfair and oversimpli-
fied description of Cass Sunstein’s primary complaint in Republic.com.51  Sun-
stein warns us of the dangers of having too widely distributed an information
production system—one where every person can find whatever information he
or she wants and filter out everything else.52  This, he argues, leads to a loss of
common culture and with it, a loss of the possibility of a common discourse nec-
essary for a polity to function well.53  Moreover, Sunstein argues, individuals
who interact only with like-minded people tend to reach more extreme posi-
50. http:// www.google.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
51. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001).
52. Id. at 55-56.
53. Id.
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tions and discount counter-arguments. 54  Thus, deliberation toward the common
good may be harder to achieve.
The aspect of Sunstein’s argument that is most relevant to the comparison of
widely distributed information production versus concentrated commercial
production is his claim that “general interest intermediaries” form the common
experiences and knowledge necessary for engaged discourse.55  Sunstein’s argu-
ment has a number of limitations, which are both internal to “republican” con-
ceptions and also a function of the limitations of that conception as a descrip-
tion of what one would consider valuable in a democracy.
Internally, there are two important limitations to the argument based on
maintaining a common culture and discourse.  First, the argument assumes that
the relevant political community is the same community whose contours are
defined by the media market.  This assumes that there are national media out-
lets and that the most relevant polity is the nation-state.  It is not implausible,
however, that the engaged polity is more important than the state within repub-
lican conceptions.  If, for example, the city rather than the nation is the level at
which engaged politics can occur, then some republican theorists would locate
power where the political action is, rather than attempt to structure engagement
so that it fits some other stated level of governance.56  More generally, if the
Internet permits engaged politics in civic groups, interest groups, and communi-
ties of interest, rather than national boundaries, then supporting that engage-
ment at the local level should be a concern of republican democracy.  In some
sense, the attempts to make the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”)57 into a representative, open, deliberative Internet gov-
ernance forum is the kind of thing one might imagine developing out of the a
republican view of the discourse actually occurring on the Internet.  It is not at
all clear that a commitment to engaged politics requires burdening local dis-
courses so as to secure the revenue streams of national media giants, on which
one relies to sustain nationwide common discourse.
This leads to the second internal criticism of this republican defense of
strong copyright.  Relying on a set of actors to define the common agenda and
culture is only acceptable if these actors are “virtuous” in the republican
sense—that is, if they set the agenda and the common culture with reference to
the common good.  Exclusive-rights-based commercial producers are unlikely
to provide such a virtuous common culture for two reasons.
First, within the republican conception, common culture only benefits a
democracy if it is made of materials conducive to creating informed and
engaged citizens.  It is crucial to see what the large speakers are saying before
one can tell whether they help or harm discourse.  There are two distinct types
54. Id. at 76-77.
55. Id. at 36.
56. See Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1128 (1980).
57. ICANN is the non-profit organization that supervises the management of Internet domain
names.  See http://www.icann.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
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of concern in this category.  First, there is what one might call the Berlusconi
effect.  Owners of large media that occupy center-stage in creating the common
culture can capture a disproportionate share of political power and undermine,
rather than serve, democracy.  Whether this effect is worth the creation of
“common culture” is questionable, unless one has a particularly naïve view of
the benign nature of media barons.  Programs like the Jerry Springer Show,
Baywatch, or even cheap network television news capture the second type of
difficulty.  Market actors are supported by advertising and direct revenues.  To
gain these revenues, market actors will offer materials that the largest number
of people, on a national and international level, will buy.  There is no reason to
think that this fare will be particularly conducive to an engaged polity; quite the
contrary.  Moreover, an information good is particularly valuable as a good
requiring property protection if it is not ephemeral.  Programming that is most
valuable to democratic discourse—ephemeral news, analysis of current affairs—
is the type of information that least benefits from exclusive rights, even when
produced commercially.
Second, Sunstein’s conception of the relationships of individuals to the
information production and exchange system is too passive and too limited in
its view of individuals as consumers in the market.  He does not consider the
productive, rather than the consumption, role that individuals can play.  Diver-
sity on the Internet does not exist primarily because someone decided to sell
consumers something in a finely sliced market segment—the segmentation Sun-
stein sees as occurring and embodied in Negroponte’s trope, the Daily Me.58
Instead, the diversity exists because individuals themselves participate in devel-
oping and expressing a viewpoint.  This is precisely the type of productive
relationship to the information flow in one’s polity that peer-production facili-
tates and proprietary production squelches.  It is in these yeoman speakers that
republican democracy thrives, and squelching their speech to maintain universal
attention to synthetic discourse packaged for mass consumption is perverse.
Widely distributed and noncommercial production strategies—those best
characterized by the emerging properties of peer production on the Internet—
are particularly attractive from the perspective of liberal conceptions of democ-
racy.  This includes both pluralist conceptions and discourse-focused substan-
tive conceptions that root the value of discourse in individuals rather than an
independent valuation of “the common good.”  In this context, “pluralist” con-
ceptions means those conceptions that accept as given the possibility that some
people’s interests will be fundamentally and irreconcilably opposed.  They are
conceptions aimed at a polity that will allow people to express their interests,
fight over them politically, and implement them in law.  The implementation,
however, occurs subject to constraints that allow the losers in the political proc-
ess sufficient freedom from coercion to remain committed to the democratic
polity rather than trying to resist it.59  Liberal discourse-oriented conceptions of
58. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
59. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 103-04 (1993).
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democracy, as opposed to republican or communitarian conceptions of democ-
racy, largely focus on the equivalent notion that democracy entails engaged dis-
course by individuals.  Such discourse-oriented conceptions draw the legitimacy
of sovereignty from maintaining appropriate conditions to allow people to
engage in fair and open discourse.60  It differs from the pluralist conception in
that it assumes the possibility of the emergence of common values through dia-
logue among participants and sees such discourse, rather than the clearance of
pre-defined conflicting values in peaceful co-existence, as the core of democ-
racy.  Both these conceptions, however, value the possibility of discourse not
only, or even primarily, on a society-wide basis but also, importantly, in smaller
settings, even among like-minded people, working to clarify and develop a full
conception of the values they hold as well as the ability to express these views.
The capacity of individuals in small and large groups to come together to dis-
cuss their interests is central to a well-functioning democracy under both these
liberal conceptions.  Also, the capacity of non-proprietary production or serv-
ice-based provision of the platforms over which individuals and groups “meet”
to engage in dialogue and collective self-definition becomes central to the
democratic enterprise.  It, rather than the generation of a “common culture” to
be received by individuals, becomes the most important mode of information
production.  An important caveat here is that if, as Sunstein claims, individuals
become more polarized and less willing to listen and engage in discourse when
they talk to like-minded people,61 then this conception of discourse-centered
democracy, not only the nationwide republican version, will be undermined by
discourse occurring solely at the level of small groups.
The point of this discussion is not, of course, to offer an exhaustive demo-
cratic theory of communications.  The point is to outline the considerations and
concerns regarding democracy that can be seen as involved in decisions about
stronger or weaker exclusive private rights.  To the extent one values active,
engaged individual participation in defining and expressing political values in a
polity as central to the democratic enterprise, one should strengthen peer-based
models of information production and exchange, even if this requires policies
that weaken proprietary production based on a sale of goods model.
B. Autonomy
Autonomy is also a concept admitting of many conceptions, some quite vig-
orously opposed to others.  In general, conceptions of autonomy can be divided
into two camps: formal—or as Richard Fallon described them, ascriptive—and
substantive.62  “Ascriptive” refers to those conceptions that view autonomy as a
capacity ascribed to human subjects as an assumption of liberal law making.  As
60. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS & NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
ITS LIBERAL STATE (1980).
61. SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 76-77.
62. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 875 (1994).
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Robert Post explains, the nature of “structures of social authority” will depend
on whether they treat the object of regulation as autonomous individuals.63
“From the point of view of the designer of the structure, therefore, the presence
or absence of autonomy functions as an axiomatic and foundational principle.”64
Those who adhere to an ascriptive conception assume the existence of auton-
omy as a foundational principle, not as a proper subject for institutional
manipulation.  Therefore, autonomy is also “formal” in that it operates as an
analytic constraint on law making, rather than substantive, or concerned with
identifying and affecting the actual condition of autonomy of individuals.  Sub-
stantive, or descriptive conceptions of autonomy, locate individual autonomy
within the actual constraints, both internal and external, with which real human
beings live.  Under the substantive conception, autonomy is a capacity and a
condition admitting of degree, which is partly a function of, rather than an
assumption underlying, institutional structures.  It functions not as a formal
analytic constraint on policymaking, but as a substantive goal to be attained by
policy.  In this framework, achieving, preserving, and improving the autonomy
of actual individuals is a proper, for some the primary, object of liberal institu-
tional design.
Elsewhere I have attempted to offer a specific set of practical guidelines for
autonomy-loving institutional design in the area of information policy that is
neutral as among these competing conceptions.65  While I derive the policy
guidelines from a substantive conception of autonomy, the operative design
principles are two that cannot offend even those who hold a purely ascriptive or
formal conception of autonomy.
First, law or policy that systematically and drastically reduces the informa-
tion available to large numbers of, or defined classes of, individuals in a society,
undermines autonomy.  “Reduces” has both a quantitative and a qualitative
dimension.  The quantitative dimension is largely irrelevant in a modern liberal
state and is more relevant to describe totalitarian efforts to control people’s
lives by severely restricting information flows to them.  The qualitative dimen-
sion is still very much relevant even in the most liberal of democracies and
involves the availability of information about non-mainstream or critical life
options.  For an individual to be autonomous, she must play a substantial role in
defining her life plan.  Where the range of life options perceived is largely con-
gruent with the range of behaviors followed by everyone else in the mainstream
of her society, the opportunity to make that life her own, as opposed to simply
the life she leads as part of a herd, is diminished.  The presence of knowledge
about and opportunity for unconventional life choices enable an individual to
make any life plan her autonomously selected own.
63. Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1131 (1993).
64. Id.
65. Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 23, 109-113 (2001).
BENKLER_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:41 PM
Winter/Spring 2003] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 189
Second, a law that systematically gives one person or class of people control
over the information flows that make up the information environment within
which others live is a law that suffers an autonomy deficit.  To the extent that a
law increases the opportunities for one person to manipulate the information
another person receives, so as to make that other hew more closely to a life plan
set by the manipulator, the law violates the autonomy of the person whose
information is so manipulated.
Both of these design principles are decidedly agnostic about whether the
immediate source of constraint on an individual’s autonomy is a government
agent.  The primary focus here is on the relative role an individual plays in
defining and pursuing his own life plan, irrespective of the source of constraint.
Whether the manipulator is the state, or whether it is state law or corporate
policy that restricts information about the range of available life options, is
irrelevant from the perspective of autonomy.  Some of the most fruitful discus-
sions of autonomy have, for example, occurred with regard to the physician-
patient relationship, where the government is absent.  This is because autonomy
is a distinctly personal and humanistic value.66  Autonomy relates to a capacity
or condition of an individual qua individual, not as a citizen of a state or con-
stituent of a community.  All constraints placed on that individual affect auton-
omy, not purely, and not always most importantly, those placed by the state.
The state-centered focus of legal analysis enters only at the level of selecting for
inquiry from among the many potential actions that affect autonomy. A legal or
constitutional inquiry, as opposed to general moral inquiry, into autonomy is
concerned with laws that affect the relative role individuals have in selecting
and pursuing a life plan.  But whether those laws directly restrict autonomy, or
indirectly do so by, for example, placing one non-government person in the
position to control the life of another, is irrelevant to the question of whether
those laws restrict autonomy.
The practical implication of all this is that there is an area of overlap
between the concerns of democracy—at least a wide range of liberal versions of
democracy—and those of autonomy.  A widely dispersed system of information
production, which produces a wide range of diverse information about and rep-
resentations of how life can be, serves autonomy in the first dimension just as it
serves robust democratic discourse.  Furthermore, large-scale commercial
media that occupy most of the channels of communication and control most of
the cultural raw materials from which expression is made have substantial
power to shape the perception of alternative life choices available to many indi-
viduals. An Internet-like system of news and cultural production, operating
with weak property rights, dissipates this power and structures the interaction
of individuals with the information flows around them in a less externally con-
trolled pattern.
66. By humanistic I mean to emphasize that it is a value that places the human being at the center
of moral gravity, rather than any external supra-individual being, such as God or community.
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In addition, some aspects of autonomy are directly tied to the emergence of
peer-production.  However, these aspects are more closely associated with a
substantive, or descriptive, rather than formal or ascriptive, conception of
autonomy.  The emergence of peer-production as an economic—and ultimately
social—transformation represents, most importantly, a change in the menu of
options for productivity in the information economy.  In the “atoms economy,”67
we settled more or less on two modes of making production decisions: the
market and hierarchy (whether in managerial firms or government-owned
enterprise).  Coase’s Nature of the Firm explains that markets best coordinate
some economic activities, while managers better organize others.68  Accordingly,
most individuals live their productive life as part of corporate organizations,
with relatively limited control over how, what, or when they produce.  These
organizations, in turn, interact with each other through a combination of mar-
kets and hierarchy.  Consumption is strictly separated from production for most
people and is largely devoted to receipt of finished goods, not to creative utili-
zation of materials to shape one’s own environment.  What emerges in the
information economy is a model of peer-production—where individuals com-
municate with each other about what projects are worth pursuing, and who
might want to take them up and share their products in an economy of gifts,
reputation, and relationally-based rewards.  Consumption and production are
integrated, not separated, so that each individual is a user, rather than either
purely a producer or a consumer.
From the perspective of autonomy, there are two enormously important
chunks of life during which individuals can play a larger role in defining how
their time is spent: production and consumption.  The production dimension of
autonomy occupied much of the “third way” literature that emerged in the
1980s, from Piore and Sable’s Second Industrial Divide69 to Unger’s False Neces-
sity.70  It is mirrored on the consumption side by the shift to “user” from con-
sumer.  Because this shift is an attribute of autonomy that is not necessarily
shared across conceptions of autonomy, I have not included it as a core consid-
eration in thinking about autonomy and information policy for purposes of
analyzing the liberal constitutional constraints on the creation of exclusive pri-
vate rights in information and cultural materials.  Yet as background, for those
who do believe that autonomy is affected by how much of one’s day is, and
what range of activities are, more or less valuable under an individual’s control,
peer production should be a valued social and economic phenomenon; a phe-
nomenon that policymakers concerned with autonomy should facilitate.
67. Nicholas Negraponte divided the world of business into “atoms” such as manufacturing busi-
nesses, and “bits,” such as online digital-based business.  See NICHOLAS NEGRAPONTE, BEING
DIGITAL 1 (1995) available at http://archives.obs.us.com/obs/english/books/nn/ch01c01.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2002).
68. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
69. MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES SABLE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1982).
70. ROBERTO MANGABERIA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL
THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY (1987).
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There are two important concerns regarding the claim that autonomy is
served by weak exclusive rights that lead to decentralized information produc-
tion.  First, there is the information overload complaint.  Wide distribution of
the capacity to produce information leads to the generation of a tremendous
amount of information of varying degrees of quality.  An agent who constantly
needs to sift through mounds of data to understand the world is left exhausted
and incapable of making a decision, rather than empowered to control his own
life.
There are two reasons why the concern with information overload does not
suggest a retreat from the limited design principles proposed here.  First,
although a widely distributed information production system causes potential
information overload, a concentrated information production system may still
not be preferable from the perspective of autonomy.  If the “filter” that reduces
the amount of information available to an individual is perfectly aligned with
the individual’s interest in being autonomous, a concentrated system may suc-
ceed from an autonomy perspective.  Unfortunately, deviations from this ideal
state create a situation where the filter controls the life of the recipient.  The
more that the mechanism of reducing the amount of information and its organi-
zation through a relevance and accreditation algorithm is controlled by a third
party with an agenda of its own, the more the price paid for reducing informa-
tion by concentrating the information production function becomes unaccept-
able.  Second, increasingly sophisticated mechanisms allow individuals to
reduce the amount of information they receive without abdicating control of
one’s life to Berlusconi or Murdoch.  An individual may utilize technical
mechanisms to customize the information environment encountered according
to parameters the individual sets.  These are some of the same mechanisms that
Sunstein decries as harming the public sphere.  Furthermore, relevance and
accreditation themselves are being produced on a peer-production model, as
one sees in a wide range of sites, including the Open Directory Project,71 Slash-
dot,72 some aspects of Google.com,73 Everything2.com,74 and many others.75  As
these mechanisms for common, non-proprietary production of the relevance
and accreditation function improve, individuals will be able to manage the uni-
verse of diverse information available to them without subjecting themselves to
the power of others to the point of surrendering their autonomy.
Second, specifically with regard to exclusive private rights in information,
there is an argument that autonomy or some conception of individual freedom
actually supports, rather than criticizes, exclusive private rights.  This is largely
the argument underlying European moral rights.  Perhaps, goes this argument,
there is some “cost” in terms of autonomy from the creation of exclusive rights
71. See http://dmoz.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
72. See http://slashdot.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
73. See http://everything2.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
74. See http://www.google.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
75. See Benkler, Intellectual Property, supra note 38.
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to control information and cultural materials, but there are also strong auton-
omy-based claims to such exclusive rights.  This article is mine in the deep moral
sense that it is an external reflection of my intellectual will and that it, in some
sense, is an externalization of my persona, my identity.  It is much more me than
many physical things that belong to me, and at least on a Hegelian conception
of property, I have a very strong claim to exclusive control over it as the
embodiment of my will and the creation of my personality.76
Initially, it should be understood that such an argument can be based only
on a substantive or descriptive conception of autonomy, not on a formal or
ascriptive conception of autonomy.  Under a formal conception, law treats indi-
viduals as having the capacity for autonomy independent of or prior to law, and
designs law accordingly.  Autonomy under this conception cannot be a function
of the law that gives exclusive rights.  People are autonomous regardless of
whether you grant them such exclusive rights.  Furthermore, nothing about
formal recognition of individuals’ capacity for autonomy requires that (a.) law
prohibit some people from reading, viewing, or reworking cultural materials
that (b.) they, as a practical matter, can read, view, or rework, so that (c.) other
people can successfully pursue their plans to make money from selling permis-
sion to read, view, or rework.77  An autonomy-based argument in favor of exclu-
sive rights must therefore rely on some substantive conception of autonomy,
one that sees autonomy as in some important measure a function of and
dependent on the legal framework within which individuals live, rather than as
an axiomatic presupposition to its design.  This is not to say that such an argu-
ment is improper, in particular given that aspects of my own argument rely on a
substantive conception of autonomy.  But it does weaken the appeal of this
argument as a criticism of autonomy-oriented policy design principles that are
intentionally limited to those that can be defended on grounds neutral as
between these two basic conceptions of autonomy.
Substantively, there are two types of answers to the argument from the
moral claims of the author.  The first, to which I will return, is that this argu-
ment is irrelevant whenever the owner of the copyright is a corporation.  Works
76. For the most complete statement of the Hegelian property theory underlying intellectual prop-
erty, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
77. This description does not undermine the acceptability of my design principles to a formal con-
ception of autonomy.  The formal conception will not accept law designed to enhance or facilitate
autonomy of persons.  Indeed, it does not acknowledge the coherence of such an enterprise.  A formal
conception, however, has no objections to a legal design principle that constrains law from being
shaped so as to limit the information flows to already autonomous individuals in a way that either limits
the options they see too much, or that gives the controller of information flows power to manipulate
the autonomous subject by selectively revealing and concealing information.  A substantive conception
of autonomy would treat such laws as “reducing” the autonomy of the agent, while a formal conception
might treat them as “violating” the agent’s autonomy.  The congruence between these conceptions in
their treatment of the policy design principles is not analytical, but practical.  I am not claiming to have
found a philosopher’s stone; only the analysis of specific policy proposals can adopt—as a self-con-
straining device—a focus on finding policies that are “autonomy loving” under either conception.  The
reason to do so is that those policies are an area of practical agreement among autonomy lovers and
can be adopted to enhance autonomy without a need to solve more or less immutable disputes about
the nature of human agency.
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for hire, complex multi-participant works such as films that movie studios pro-
duce, works otherwise assigned to corporations are no longer the expression of
autonomy.  Rather, they represent an alienation of the connection between the
author and the work.  It is precisely for this reason that countries with strong
moral rights traditions do not recognize work-for-hire or alienation of the moral
rights, as opposed to commercial exploitation rights.  Treating corporations as
legal persons may be a very useful legal construct for organizing human produc-
tion, but that does not make corporations into agents with independent moral
claims.  Since in many cases the claimant is a corporate owner of rights, not an
individual author, the moral claims in favor of exclusive rights are weak.
The second answer is that autonomy does not support the actual exclusive
rights Americans have—which are almost completely focused on commodifica-
tion and alienation.  If at all, autonomy supports rights that are not recognized
in the United States—inalienable rights to attribution and control over integrity
of the work.  The Hegelian defense of intellectual property derives from a
notion that individual will expresses itself and embodies the person in things.78
The strongest rights derived from this notion are rights to be associated with the
expression and rights to maintain the expression’s integrity in the form in which
a person has expressed their personality.  The former requirement, attribution,
has to do with the sense that the value of the thing as an expression of self is in
its being an expression of a particular self—its author—and not a fungible
expression of human creativity as a general category.  The latter requirement,
integrity, has to do with respect for the thing as a unique expression of self, and
it requires that the individual be able to control that expression, because its
alteration, and in particular its alteration inconsistent with the will of the
author, alienates the expression from the person and undermines the capacity
of the person to be expressed and embodied in the intellectual creation.  This is
why European “moral rights” include rights of attribution and integrity that
resist removal of the actual author from future control over his or her work.79  In
the United States, quite to the contrary, such practices as work-for-hire and
relinquishment of authorial control are perfectly common. American exclusive
rights are focused on enabling and facilitating the alienation and economic
exploitation of covered works, not on giving authors inalienable rights to attri-
bution and control over the integrity of the work.  The moment of alienation is
the weakest point of the Hegelian defense of property.  At that point, one
person parts with the thing that previously embodied his will, handing it over to
the property of another, who acquires it as part of her plans to embody her will
in the thing.  Continued control after alienation would subject the latter to the
will of the former.  Hegelian intellectual property theory then has to rely on
some instrumental explanation to sustain support for alienability of the
78. See Hughes, supra note 76 at 344-45.
79. See Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interest: The Concordance of Copyright Law and Moral
Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. J. 601, 653-54 (2001)
(detailing the concept of moral rights in each of the European nations).
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commodity aspects of the work, while requiring inalienability of the moral
claims.
Commodification and alienation of my work—the treatment of it as a thing
alienable from me and exchangeable for money through a market80—is an act of
separation of the thing from what is uniquely mine and its instantiation in a
fungible commodity.  That is not to say that it is morally wrong of me to alien-
ate my work.  But when I do so, I am treating those aspects of the work that I
am selling as a commodity, whose fungible remuneration is useful to me, but is
not an expression of me.  Certainly, when the entire right is alienated, as when
an author sells all rights to the work to the publisher, what has happened is
alienation, not embodiment.  And where copies are sold and the right protect-
ing the market in copies is a prohibition on selling copies, each copy is a thing
that does not embody the self and which is instead a thing through which the
reader is attempting to embody him or herself.  Justin Hughes argued in favor
of treating the right to control copying as nonetheless a personality-based right.
Hughes claimed that by paying me money readers recognize my personality,
while those who do not pay for copies recognize the personality embodied in
the work no more than a trespasser recognizes the property of a landowner.81
Yet a company that invests some of its excess cash in buying art based on pro-
fessional advice as to what will appreciate in value is not “recognizing the per-
sonality of the artist.”  Additionally, fans passing bootleg tapes are expressing a
complete association between the artistic expression and the artist and are
expressing adoration of the artist’s personality as embodied in the art.  To hold
otherwise is to be a “fetishist of little green paper.”82  Failure to pay for the
commodity or for its utilization largely in the form in which it was commodi-
tized is, at most, an interference with the artist’s success in commoditizing her
work.  If commoditizing her work is her life plan, a refusal to pay for the com-
modity interferes with her wellbeing as an autonomous agent, constituted by her
success in pursuing her autonomously chosen life plan.83  But they are not inter-
ferences with the thing as an expression of her personality and are not interfer-
ences with her autonomy—her capacity to express herself in the world through
the manipulation of ideas and symbolic representations.  On the contrary, it is
when one interjects a right to commoditize against someone else who uses
materials one authored as part of the materials with which they choose to
express their autonomous view of the world, that autonomy is offended.
A perfect example of this is open-source licensing or free software licenses.
An open source license will often secure the original author’s rights of attribu-
80. I rely here on Radin’s definition.  See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES
118-19 (1990).
81. Hughes, supra note 76 at 349.
82. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 246 (1985).
83. Raz defines the wellbeing of an autonomous agent in terms of successful pursuit of an autono-
mously chosen life.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 390-95 (1986).
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tion and integrity,84 while eschewing commercial exploitation rights.  This type
of license, therefore, is an implementation of the autonomy of the authors that
largely preserves the expressive autonomy of users.  The license enhances
autonomy on both sides.  As a result, open source licenses are directly inverse
to more traditional licenses that serve the commercial exploitation interests of
the original authors (but not their personality interests) while restricting the
expressive autonomy of users.  
Consider also the Wind Done Gone case.85  There, SunTrust Bank, adminis-
trator of Margaret Mitchell’s estate, sued Houghton Mifflin, the publishers of
Alice Randall’s book, to prevent its publication.  The book told a story that
clearly borrowed from Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind.  First, if Sun-
Trust Bank were the owner of the copyright, standing in its own shoes because
it had hired Margaret Mitchell and owned the copyright, it would have had
commercial but not moral claims to the book.  Second, assuming SunTrust
Bank was simply asserting Mitchell’s rights as administrator of the Mitchell
estate, the claims must be considered as though they were made by Mitchell.
Imagine that Alice Randall and the bank had conducted negotiations in
which the bank required Randall to pay the bank 25% of the revenues from
The Wind Done Gone and omit any direct or implicit reference to interracial
sex.86  It is intuitively simple to see this request for payment as one for commer-
cial exploitation of the work.  It may be perfectly sensible for the author to
demand payment.  It may also be perfectly sensible, on a utilitarian calculus, for
society to pass a law requiring Randall to either pay what the bank asks or
forego use of the story.  Still, it is not a violation of Mitchell’s autonomy for
Randall to refuse to pay.  If, however, the romantic view of the Old South was a
central component of Mitchell’s world view, and its expression in Gone with the
Wind is an expression of this central aspect of her self, then use of her book,
through a critical prism, to expose the ubiquity of interracial sex in the Old
South is something that goes to the integrity of Mitchell’s work as an expression
of her self.  Yet it is precisely this transformative utilization of work to subvert
and mock the very message of the original author that is the quintessential case
of permitted fair use in U.S. copyright law.  In terms of autonomy and democ-
racy, this is not a surprising calculus.  Randall’s retelling of this story, given the
central role it plays in American culture by masking what she perceives to be a
central truth in her experience as an African American woman and the central
role it played in her childhood in defining her alienation from American society,
is central to her autonomy. Moreover, Mitchell’s autonomy is directly pitted
against the democratic commitment to airing the widest range of views
84. This is seen most expressly in the Open Source Definition, Version 1.9 Section 4, available at
http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition_plain.html; see also GNU GPL § 2(a).
85. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
86. See David D. Kirkpatrick, A Writer’s Tough Lesson in Birthin’ a Parody, N.Y. TIMES, April 26,
2001, at E1.
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expressed in the terms that their speakers find most effective to convey their
message.
C. The Court as an Institutional Counterbalance
The preceding two subparts outlined substantive support for the robust con-
straints Article I of the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment impose on
the creation and definition of exclusive private rights in information.  At their
core, Article I and the First Amendment claim that both democracy and auton-
omy are better served by an information production and exchange system built
around a robust public domain, rather than one built around extensive regula-
tion of the use of information and cultural materials through the creation and
enforcement of exclusive private rights.  This subpart discusses the institutional
reason, rather than the substantive reason, to introduce close judicial scrutiny of
legislation that expands exclusive private rights at the expense of the public
domain.
Our legislative process demonstrates a systematic imbalance in favor of the
expansion and deepening of exclusive rights to information at the expense of
the public domain.  The imbalance exists because the benefits of such rights are
clearly seen by, and expressed by, well-defined interest holders that exist at the
time the legislation is passed.  In contrast, most of the social costs—which are
economic, social, political, and moral—are diffuse and likely to be experienced
in the future by parties not yet aware of the fact that they will be affected by the
extension of rights.  For example, the Estate of Margaret Mitchell knew that an
extension of copyright, negotiated in the 1960s, then in the 1970s, and again in
the 1990s, would increase revenues to the estate by postponing the date when
the book falls into the public domain.  Alice Randall, however, was too young
in the 1960s or 1970s to participate in the debate.  Similarly, it is unlikely Ran-
dall focused on the effect the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 (the “Copyright Term Extension Act”),87 would have on her book when it
was under debate.  Likewise, Ed Felten in his worst nightmares probably could
not have imagined that his academic paper on the weaknesses of the Secure
Digital Music Initiative would subject him to civil suit, and, if Dmitry Sklyarov’s
experience is a predictor, perhaps even criminal liability.  The recording indus-
try, however, when it was lobbying for the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
had a clear sense that this legislation would enable them to sell encrypted music
in a more tightly controlled fashion.
In contrast, it is never the case that the diffuse and future users will band
together to expand fair use.  Even if they were to band together, it is impossible
that copyright owners would remain unaware of the initiative and fail to offer
substantial opposition in the legislative process.  The legislative process, there-
fore, has a systematic bias toward more extensive exclusive, private rights at the
expense of the public domain.  This bias explains the constitutional framework
87. Pub. L. No. 105-298 (1998).
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developed by the Supreme Court over the past century whereby courts provide
a filter to limit Congress’s power to expand private information rights.  Both the
threshold inquiry of Article I, and the Turner standard for First Amendment
review, treat expansion of rights as subject to constitutional scrutiny.  In con-
trast, expansion of the public domain, or elimination of exclusive rights does not
require the same scrutiny.  Expansion removes constraints on the use of cultural
materials and information, making more modes of expression available.  Thus,
it deregulates, rather than regulates, the use of cultural and information materi-
als.  The justification of this one-way ratchet is precisely the systematic imbal-
ance in the other lawmaking branch—the legislature.  Since too extensive a
definition of rights is economically inefficient and harms both democracy and
autonomy, but is directly in the interest of a powerful lobby, it is the role of
courts to prevent the systematic and excessive expansion of exclusive rights by
serving as a backstop against this political economy.
Moreover, it is important to underscore that it is even more justified for
courts to act as a moderating force on politics in the area of intellectual prop-
erty rights than in media regulation—a parallel area of regulation of informa-
tion production and exchange where courts have taken a very active role.
When the broadcast and cable industries battle over “must carry” rules, each
industry is well represented in Congress, and all of the potentially regulated
parties are at the table. Power plays and successful capture of an agency or a
legislature sometimes determine the outcome of this process.  Often, however,
negotiated deals determine the outcome and are later challenged by actors in
the negotiation who try to make their deal sweeter.  Laws regulating large play-
ers whose interests are well defined and understood at the time of the regula-
tion—like broadcast, cable, or telephone regulation—are therefore substantially
less in need of judicial review from an institutional perspective.  In contrast,
with copyright and similar exclusive rights judges must be attentive to prevent
legislatures from selling the store in the absence of the parties likely to bear the
primary brunt of the regulation.
IV
PRESSURE POINTS—THE STATE OF PLAY TODAY
Thus far I have covered two issues.  First, I have delineated in doctrinal
terms the constitutional framework within which Congress can regulate the use
of information and cultural materials through the creation and definition of
exclusive private rights.  In this context, Article I of the Constitution operates as
a threshold constraint, requiring Congress to show in creating such rights: (1)
that the exclusive control the rights grant can plausibly increase information
and cultural production, (2) that the rights be given only to those who add
original contributions, and (3) that the rights not prevent use of materials in the
public domain.  The First Amendment then requires Congress to show that any
given right meets, at least, the Turner standard of intermediate scrutiny.  In
subpart III, I explain why such a vigorous system of judicial review is norma-
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tively required.  My argument is that both democracy and autonomy are served
by a robust public domain and harmed by exclusive rights that excessively
regulate the use of information, knowledge, and cultural materials.  Moreover,
the political economy of legislation is such that the legislature will systemati-
cally tend to create exclusive rights beyond what is economically efficient, as
well as beyond what gives proper consideration to the implications of these
rights for democracy and autonomy.
This section briefly outlines six particularly salient pressure points on this
constitutional framework.
A. That’s Not What the Law Says at All
The description I have given of the law is declarative—as though it is an
uncontroversial view of the constitutional framework that constrains Congress
from regulating information and cultural production too greatly.  It is not.  It is
a decidedly contested view, though I believe it is the best reading of the
Supreme Court’s precedent.  It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court
largely has been more solicitous of user privileges and less enamored with
“intellectual property” than the lower courts.  In addition, not all the lower
courts have accepted the spirit of the constitutional framework delimited by the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area.  The lower courts’ rejection of the
Supreme Court’s view that either Article I or the First Amendment substan-
tially constrain Congress is most completely and starkly seen in Eldred v.
Reno.88
Eldred v. Reno reviews Congress’ adoption of the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act in 1998.  Through this Act, Congress extended the copyright protection
term from life of the author plus fifty years to life of the author plus seventy
years.  The Act extended the seventy-five year term of protection for works ini-
tially owned by a corporation to a ninety-five year term.89  These extensions
were retroactively applied to existing works.90  Eric Eldred, a retired program-
mer who scans out-of-print books and produces online editions for free distribu-
tion, challenged the Copyright Term Extension Act because it prohibited him
from scanning and making available works that would have fallen into the
public domain but for the extension.  The D.C. Circuit rejected Eldred’s claims
that the Copyright Term Extension Act violated the “limited times” constraint
imposed by the Exclusive Rights Clause and the First Amendment. 91  It held
that the Preamble provides no constraint on the power of Congress and that
when Congress creates the limited monopolies that it is empowered to create
under Article I, it is subject to rationality review.92  The Circuit Court seemed
88. 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted sub nom, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126, and
cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
89. Id. at 373.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 374.
92. Id. at 380.
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little bothered by the fact that its holding directly contradicts the Supreme
Court’s decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.  In Graham, the Court stated:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a spe-
cific constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress “To promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.” Art. I, § 8,  cl. 8. . . .  The Congress in the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.93
The Circuit Court brushed away this specific requirement that copyright be for
“limited times.”  The court claimed that “limited times” included very long, but
not perpetual, grants, as well as retroactive extensions of time.  Its argument
with regard to the First Amendment claim was the implausible argument that
laws Congress calls “copyright” are “categorically immune” from First
Amendment scrutiny.94
The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998—although not the decision in
Eldred v. Reno—provides an excellent ground for explaining how the two con-
stitutional constraints should interact.  First, there is the retroactive application
aspect of the Act.  According to Graham, Congress can only create exclusive
rights if the new rights could plausibly stimulate creation and if they do not
remove anything from the public domain.95  The adoption of a retroactive exten-
sion for works that have already been created fails both tests set forth in
Graham.  First, retroactive extension cannot plausibly promote the progress of
science and the useful arts.96  It cannot create incentives.  Margaret Mitchell will
not rewrite Gone with the Wind in 1998 no matter how many more years of
copyright protection the book receives.  Similarly, new books will not be written
because old books are retroactively protected for a longer period than their
authors were promised when they wrote them.  For any future action to be
affected by retroactive extension, a current author would have to think that a
project would not justify itself under the present term of copyright but would
nonetheless be worth the effort if copyright were extended to an additional
given term, discounted by the probability that copyright will in fact be extended
in the future to that necessary length.  The implausibility of this argument can
readily be captured by conjuring up the image of a movie studio executive
pitching a project to investors by saying, “we won’t make money within the sev-
enty-five years that copyright law currently gives us, but Congress has tradition-
ally extended rights over time, and if Congress extends copyright to ninety-five
years, we’ll make a killing on this one!”
Second, once a work is created, there are aspects of it that are enclosed, and
aspects of it that are in the public domain.  When Margaret Mitchell wrote
Gone with the Wind in 1936, the longest term of protection possible for the
book was fifty-six years.  In 1936, then, the state of the world was that the
93. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
94. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375-76.
95. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
96. See William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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enclosed domain included the book Gone with the Wind for fifty-six years.  The
public domain included the book Gone with the Wind in the year 1992.  This is
not a word game.  It is an economically accurate description of the state of the
resource called Gone with the Wind as perceived at the time of its creation by
rational economic actors.  If someone were to value the rights to make a movie
from the book, they would have to price the license necessary.  Imagine that the
price is P.  Whether it is worth paying that price is partly a function of the cost
of waiting for the expiration of the copyright—P discounted to present value
from the date of expiration to the date of use.  That calculus is likely to have
little effect on a decision made in 1938, but likely to have tremendous effect on
a decision made in 1991.  Gone with the Wind is “in the public domain”—on a
deferred basis—at the moment of its creation.  The precise value of its presence
in the public domain depends on the time remaining until expiration.  To
extend the term of copyright for Gone with the Wind after it has been created is
to remove its public domain aspect from the public domain.
Where, as in the case of retroactive term extension, Congress passes a law
that removes material from the public domain with no plausible claim to
increase incentives for creation, the law must fail under the limitations of the
Exclusive Rights Clause.  The Eldred court’s failure to discipline its rationality
review by focusing on the specific elements required by Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the Constitution resulted in practically no review of the Copyright
Term Extension Act.
But what becomes of the prospective application of the Act?  Extending
protection from seventy-five to ninety-five years for works that do not yet exist
removes nothing from the public domain.  The story of the movie executive is
slightly different.  Here the pitch must be, “we won’t make money within the
first seventy-five years, but just you wait for years seventy-six through ninety-
five!”  It is possible that this aspect too will not pass the “promoting progress”
threshold test.97  If, however, it does pass the threshold, the prospective applica-
tions should not pass the Turner standard.  The extension substantially burdens
present expressive interests—interests of those people like Eldred who wish to
use old materials expressively.  The government’s legitimate goal of giving suf-
ficient incentives to authors is only furthered very weakly, if at all, and certainly
there is no evidence, empirical or theoretical, suggesting that a less restrictive
means—such as life of the author plus fifty years, or a term of fifty-six or
twenty-eight years, is insufficient.
Considering this background, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Eldred v. Reno
represents a lack of understanding of the constitutional dimensions of copyright
law and the role of the judiciary in ensuring that the use of information and cul-
tural materials by everyone is regulated no more than necessary.  The decision
97. Both Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 323-28 (1970), and Landes & Posner,
supra note 96, express substantial doubts about the marginal impact of term lengths so distant into the
future.
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neglects the important role courts have to play as an institutional counterbal-
ance to a systematically imbalanced and overprotective legislative process.  The
court entirely misses the regulatory aspects of exclusive private rights and the
necessity of a significant level of judicial First Amendment scrutiny to protect
against over-regulation of access to, and use of, the cultural and information
environment by individuals regardless of whether under that standard, it finds
the DMCA unconstitutional.  Needless to say, how the Supreme Court will
resolve Eldred will largely settle the core question of the relationship between
the constitution and the line demarcating the boundary between the public and
proprietary domains.
B. Neo-Lochnerism and the Moral Inversion of the First Amendment
For over a century, lawyers have been treating corporations as legal “per-
sons.”  With habit, this useful legal fiction has taken on a natural aura, as
though General Motors and Joe’s Trucking were just like individuals for all
purposes.  This fiction was not particularly important from a First Amendment
perspective as long as free speech law was largely occupied with working out
the relationship of the First Amendment to direct censorship, as it was through-
out the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.  As the information economy
and society have moved to center stage, the First Amendment is increasingly
used to impose judicial review on all regulation of this sphere of social and eco-
nomic life.
Starting with cases like First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,98 which pro-
tected a corporation’s right to speak on matters of public concern as part of
public discourse, and continuing with cases like Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,99 which began to protect cor-
porate speech aimed for commercial purposes, First Amendment jurisprudence
has gradually shifted to treating corporate speakers engaged in any form of
information production and exchange as though they were no different than
individual speakers engaged in political discourse or personal expression.  This
is an exaggerated characterization of the law in this area that I will not defend.
Rather I will use it to identify a potential source of instability in First Amend-
ment law.
The trend towards judicial review of the regulation of how corporations
make money from information production, exchange, and carriage as though
the regulation was aimed at individual rights, not economic regulation, has a
particularly alarming trajectory in an information economy.  The normatization
of this position is nowhere more starkly evident than in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s joining the majority in the United Foods case.100  In Central Hudson,
it was then Justice Rehnquist who accused the Court of returning to the
98. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
99. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
100. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 429 (2001).
BENKLER_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:41 PM
202 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 66:173
Lochner v. New York101 era.102  In United Foods, the Chief Justice joined the
Court in finding unconstitutional a regulation that required mushroom growers
to contribute to a general fund to support advertising mushrooms.103  Justice
Breyer responded, “I do not believe the First Amendment seeks to limit the
Government’s economic regulatory choices in this way—any more than does
the Due Process Clause.”104  His invocation of the specter of Lochner in the con-
text of First Amendment law was the first since Justice Rehnquist used it for the
same purpose two decades earlier.
The video dial tone cases starkly exemplified the implications of this First
Amendment interpretation trend in an economy where information production,
dissemination, and carriage are central.105  In the early 1990s, the FCC sought to
allow telephone carriers into the video delivery market, with the caveat that the
telephone carriers do so as common carriers.  The FCC’s video dial tone order
required carriers to carry video signals on a nondiscriminatory basis, just as the
FCC had previously required for telephone and data signals.  The appellate
courts treated this imposition as a violation of the telephone companies’ edito-
rial rights—the right to determine what information they would carry over their
systems.106  This, in turn, led these courts to scrutinize the economic rationale of
the common carriage requirement—which was based on the FCC’s experience
with the telephone carriers as providers of competitive services dependent on
their platform.107  Rejecting the economic rationale offered by the FCC, the
courts overturned the video dial tone order as violating the First Amendment.108
The Supreme Court eventually vacated the case as moot, because the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996109 disposed of the video dial tone model.110
But the problem persists.111
Perhaps the most extreme version of this use of the First Amendment is
Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC.112  In this case, the D.C. Circuit invali-
dated the FCC’s limits on vertical and horizontal integration of cable carriers.113
The FCC limits were intended to maintain a sufficient number of outlets to
assure that any programmer not owned by a cable operator would have access
101. 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
102. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 589.
103. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 429.
104. Id.
105. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994); see also In re
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, First Report and Order and Second Further Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.R. 300, 309 (Nov. 22, 1991).
106. See Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 203.
107. See id. at 202-03.
108. Id. at 185.
109. Pub. L. No. 104-104 (1996).
110. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 516 U.S. 415, 416 (1996).
111. See Comcast Cablevision, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
112. 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
113. Id. at 1144.
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to forty percent of the viewers in the total U.S. market.114  The FCC decided that
a minimum of four competitors was required to achieve this goal.  It reasoned
that two competitors could collaborate, and if together they controlled more
than sixty percent of the viewers, the entities would be able to prevent pro-
grammers unaffiliated with them from surviving.115  The FCC therefore capped
the total number of viewers to whom any single cable operator could offer cable
services at thirty percent.116  To the court, there was no question that this cap on
the potential number of subscribers violated the cable company’s First
Amendment rights.117  All that was left for the court to do was to supplant its
own economic judgment that there was not a high probability of collusion
between two giant competitors to shut out unaffiliated programmers for the
expert agency it was reviewing.  As a result, the D.C. Circuit found the FCC’s
regulation unconstitutional under the Turner standard, because the regulation
was not narrowly tailored.118
Now, one might think that this represents a general rise in courts’ solicitude
towards First Amendment claims against government regulation.  However, we
have already seen that in Eldred v. Reno,119 which was decided within weeks of
Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC,120 another panel of the same court
reached a diametrically opposed result.  By holding that copyright was categori-
cally exempt from First Amendment review, the court upheld a regulation sus-
tained by an economic rationale that is laughable under the Time Warner stan-
dards.  The stark difference between the two cases is instructive: the first
reverses a plausible, if unpersuasive to the judges, economic theory regarding
concentration and collusion, and the second affirms an impossible economic
theory about the effects of retroactive extension of an already ridiculously long
copyright protection period.
Clearly, one aspect of this dissonance is the fact that copyright is considered
a “private rights” concern, while horizontal ownership rules are considered a
“public regulation” concern.  Eldred and Time Warner, however, along with
other copyright cases, evidence a deeper problem of moral inversion.  For
example, in the Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic121 case the court saw the
newspapers as the First Amendment rights bearers, while the individual users
who would cut and paste stories as a basis for their political commentary and
discourse with their fellow forum participants represented a lesser interest.  The
court did not consider that the clash was between political discourse on one
hand and the right to charge for online access to archival materials (already
114. Id. at 1137.
115. Id. at 1132-33.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1129.
118. Id. at 1136.
119. 239 F.3d. 372 (D.C. Cir.) en banc denied sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1126, and cert. amended, 534 U.S. 1160 (2002).
120. 240 F.3d. 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
121. No. 98-7840, 2000 WL 1863566 (C.D.Ca. Nov. 16, 2000).
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fully remunerated through advertising) on the other hand.  The criminalization
of noncommercial use and exchange of digitized materials that one sees with the
introduction of the NET Act122 and the DMCA similarly fails to appreciate the
chilling effect on real people—like Ed Felten—of a criminal prosecution against
Dmitry Sklyarov, where the interest on the other side of the equation is the pro-
tection of a business model of a recording company or a movie studio.
This trend in First Amendment law of the information economy—towards
protecting corporations broadly, even at the expense of very real and immedi-
ate constraints on the expressive autonomy and democratic speech of individu-
als—is unstable because it represents a moral inversion of the First Amend-
ment.  The First Amendment is not a technical rule of law stating that
government shall not make any law regulating information flows regardless of
their source or nature.  Rather, it is a constitutional provision central to the
functioning of our democracy and the security of our individual autonomy.
Our democracy does not generally treat corporations as citizens.  They do
not vote.  They cannot be elected.  Their contributions to political discourse are
valued instrumentally, not intrinsically.  Their claims to speech rights derive
from the fact that corporations sometimes act as the best vehicles to bring
useful information to the attention of a democratic polity.123  From a First
Amendment perspective, that is the corporation’s only role.  This use may
entail quite substantial rights on the part of corporations, in particular news
media.  In the clash, however, between instrumental reasons to protect corpo-
rate speech and instrumental reasons to restrict it, for example, to permit others
to enrich democratic discourse over the telephone company’s network, the cal-
culus is ultimately instrumental and subject to fairly flexible balancing.  This
could be a systematic justification for a new balancing approach that Justice
Breyer seems to be developing in this area—for which he has received support
from Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg in some cases.124
Furthermore, one cannot in any coherent fashion treat corporations as the
bearers of moral claims to autonomy.  In some fashion or another, claims to
autonomy are based either in some dignitary interest or in some respect for
rational beings or will.  They are, in any event, entirely unavailable as intrinsic
claims for corporations or other corporate bodies.125  Organizations or corpora-
tions can serve or defeat autonomy.  Their regulation, similarly, may serve or
defeat autonomy.  When it does defeat autonomy, such as when a regulation
requires a corporation to prevent users from receiving information they wish to
122. Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1997).
123. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 220-21 (1989).  This is the
crux of Baker’s focus on treating the rights of corporations as always based in what he sees as the more
instrumental press clause, and not in the speech clause that he largely reserves for protection of liberty
interests in expressive autonomy.
124. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 425-28 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Gov’t Pac, 528 U.S. 377, 400-03 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225-28
(1997).
125. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREACRATIC SOCIETY 55-119 (1986).
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use or from disseminating expressions individual users wish to disseminate, the
organizations may have an autonomy-based First Amendment claim.  This
claim, however, is autonomy-based only derivatively, not directly.  As with the
case of regulation that may instrumentally limit speech in ways that limit or
enhance democracy, so too regulation of corporations may do so in ways that
limit or enhance the autonomy of individuals.
In any event, when the person regulated is a human being, a citizen of a
democracy, a direct claimant of autonomy, that person’s claims are translated
into an intrinsic First Amendment claim against instrumental regulation.  In
contrast, corporations’ claims under the same constitutional provision are
weaker, pitting one instrumental claim against another.  Particularly when the
government regulates corporations so as to serve the real parties in interest (the
constituents and individuals) in an effort to enhance speech and increase diver-
sity in discourse, the First Amendment largely devolves into assessing the
instrumental approaches to serve the same intrinsic claims.  In some sense, the
corporations’ First Amendment claims pit a rule-utilitarian instrumental
approach (it on the whole serves this desideratum to follow this rule), while the
regulation tries to serve the good more directly.
The instability comes from the flow of cases that do exactly the opposite.
Exclusive private rights in information, as they are increasingly applied to con-
strain individual use of information and cultural resources, are a form of regula-
tion of individual expressive freedom.  Very often corporations are the benefi-
ciaries of this regulation.  These regulations are subject to little or no First
Amendment scrutiny.  On the other hand, rules that limit business practices or
corporate management in an effort to give individuals greater access to infor-
mation or greater access to avenues of expression are routinely struck down.
The result is a restriction of individual expressive autonomy and democratic
discourse by and among the actual constituents of democracy.  The First
Amendment is interpreted to permit government to restrict individuals’ access
to and use of information and cultural materials, but prohibits the government
from aiding individuals by similarly restricting corporations.  The result is a
world in which both government and corporations can restrict individuals while
public corrective action to increase individual freedom is constrained.  This
inversion is partly sustained by characterizing copyright-like laws as “private
ordering” or “property laws,” and media access rules as “public laws” or
“regulations.”  Partly, this approach relies for its stability and coherence on a
workmanlike attention to doctrinal moves to the exclusion of principle, but
these strategies cannot be stable in the long run.  The moral inversion of the
First Amendment puts too much pressure on the particular form of First
Amendment law that has developed for the information economy.
C. Private Ordering
The fact that the regulations in question are usually conceptualized as prop-
erty or contract rights, rather than direct command and control regulations is
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another element that is likely to play an important role in framing the constitu-
tional understanding of exclusive rights in information and culture.  As property
or contract rights, regulations partake of the aura of “private actions,” an area
where government action is not generally subject to constitutional review
(Shelley v. Kraemer126 aside).  The operation of this construct, in its simplest
form, is seen in the D.C. Circuit’s statement in Eldred v. Reno, “plaintiffs lack
any cognizable First Amendment right to exploit the copyrighted works of
others.”127 Here the court conceptualizes the conflict as involving two private
parties—one that owns a work, another that wants to use it.  The First Amend-
ment has no traction.
The simple fact that the last person triggering a prohibition on a particular
use is not a government actor does not, however, render the prohibition
immune to First Amendment scrutiny.  Much depends, instead, on the source of
power that enables the prohibition.  Imagine that Congress created and auc-
tioned off rights to prohibit Republicans from appearing on television and sold
the rights to private parties.  What if courts are then asked to enforce the prohi-
bitions by the individuals?  Whether a particular Republican would or would
not be allowed on television would not be a government decision, but rather a
decision of the private license owner.  The source of prohibition, however,
would be a law that discriminates against speech based on viewpoint, and thus
almost without question would be struck down.  Or would it?  The baseline rule
as to cable access requirements became privatization of the censorship decision.
Nonetheless, the privatization of the decision confounds the issues. Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium128 is in many senses func-
tionally similar.  There, the Court in fact upheld a content-based regulation
against protected speech, because the law delegated the final censorship deci-
sion to cable operators.  The statute reviewed in that case129 related to cable
channels on which cable carriers were generally required to carry all program-
ming on a nondiscriminatory basis, much as would a common carrier.  The stat-
ute challenged in that case excluded from this general nondiscrimination
requirement only smut that Congress disapproved of but could not, under the
court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, directly prohibit.  While the plurality
did not find private party control dispositive, it did weigh in favor of finding
constitutionality.130  As a practical matter, the Court indeed upheld a content-
discriminating regulatory burden of protected speech that it would never have
upheld had it not been structured as a privatization of the utility censorship act.
Private party control, moreover, was the deciding factor for Justices Thomas,
Rehnquist, and Scalia.131
126. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
127. 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
129. Id. at 735.
130. See id. at 768.
131. Id. at 812 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Clearly, however, cases exist where a private person can rely on, for exam-
ple, property rights, to prevent someone from speaking, and can do so on a
viewpoint-based or any other grounds.  Indeed, such cases are regarded as the
“normal” case, while situations like the company town in Marsh v. Alabama132
are the exception.  What is the difference between exclusive private rights in
information—like copyright—and a private homeowner’s request of a guest not
to annoy everyone with praise for the Taliban?  The point is that understanding
copyright within the framework of First Amendment law does not require one
to consider whether a copyright owner is more like a company town or a mall.
In those cases, the owner of physical property would use a law that was not
directed at speech and did not use legal power to exclude the speaker.  The
speaker, in reliance on the First Amendment, demanded an exception to the
general property law.  The court either accepted or rejected this claim.  The
relationship of the First Amendment to copyright is entirely different.  Users
are not confronted with an inability to speak, print, or play music without access
to resources—like streets, parks, or transmitters—governed by a general law
like property.  They have the means to do so under their control.  They are con-
fronted with a legal rule—the law of copyright—that in the pursuit of the public
interest prohibits them from speaking, printing, or playing music in ways that
they otherwise could.  The law of copyright is the only thing that stands
between the user and the user’s capacity to speak as she pleases.  It is a public
law, enacted by the legislature, to benefit public interests, that takes the form of
telling many people that they are prohibited from printing certain words that
they want to print or publicly perform.  It may be a perfectly justifiable law, but
to say that a person has no cognizable First Amendment interest in not being
forbidden by law from printing something he or she wishes to print or say pub-
licly, and can as a practical matter print or say, is implausible.
This answer depends, however, on the theory one has regarding the source
of exclusive private rights in information.  If one takes some form of natural
rights approach—along the Lockean or Hegelian lines—then the source of the
property right is pre-legal.  In that case the law is simply enforcing pre-political
rights, whose contours therefore are not themselves reviewable “government
action.”  Then, the source of the prohibition that the owner places on the user is
not itself a reviewable law, though obviously when the Sheriff comes to enforce
the prohibition there is a government action, just as in Shelley v. Kraemer.133
If, however, one sees, as U.S. tradition and Supreme Court opinions repeat-
edly state, exclusive private rights in information as positive law, rooted in a
utilitarian calculus, then the law creating the right is itself the “law” that Con-
gress has made abridging the freedom of speech.  The meaning of an exclusive
private right in information is that Congress has identified a person who, for
reasons of the general welfare, receives a right to prevent others from saying
certain words.  The person stymied by copyright law is just like the person with
132. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
133. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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the right to prevent Republicans from talking on television.  The viewpoint neu-
trality of copyright goes to the likelihood that the law will be upheld, not to the
presence of a “cognizable First Amendment interest.”  This does not mean that
every copyright infringement case now has a case-specific First Amendment
review component.  It does, however, mean that where the law of exclusive pri-
vate rights draws the boundaries of the right, these boundaries must be subject
to First Amendment scrutiny.
While this issue is important in the copyright context, as Eldred indicates,
the primary locus for its likely mischief is in confounding the constitutional
analysis of institutional mechanisms explicitly intended to facilitate “private
ordering” of access to and use of information and cultural materials, rather than
to embed public policy choices.  This is particularly true with the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”),134 whose most controver-
sial feature is the validation of mass-market licenses.
Consider a term appended to the news reports of a technology news service:
“Information contained in this CNET News.com report may not be republished
or redistributed without the prior written authority of CNET, Inc.”135  Under
copyright law, the information contained in a report, as distinguished from the
expressive form that it takes, is not the property of the reporter.  There may be
a very limited “hot news” exception to this general rule,136 but certainly nothing
that would encompass the broad claim of right expressed in CNET’s terms.
Most courts prior to the passage of UCITA did not enforce such broad
terms.137  In refusing to enforce these provisions, some courts relied on state con-
tract law, by finding an absence of sufficient consent138 or an unenforceable con-
tract of adhesion.139 Others courts relied on preemption—stating that to the
extent state contract law purported to enforce a contract that prohibited fair use
or material in the public domain (like the raw information contained in a
report), it was preempted by federal copyright law that chose to leave this mate-
rial in the public domain.140  While the Seventh Circuit held otherwise,141 this was
the majority position prior to UCITA.  UCITA, however, obviates the state
contract law bases for refusing to enforce such contracts.
A state’s enactment of UCITA does not trigger direct constitutional review
under Article I, although it might under the First Amendment.  In Bonito
134. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) (2001), available at http://www.law.
penn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita/ucita.htm.
135. See http://news.com.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
136. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); National Basketball Ass’n v.
Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 853  (2d Cir. 1997).
137. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1248-
53 (1995).
138. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1991).
139. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 761 (E.D. La. 1987), aff’d, 847 F.2d 255
(5th Cir. 1988).
140. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
141. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Court specifically stated that the
limitations imposed on Congress by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 did not
directly apply to the states.142 The Court, however, also held that states could not
create rights that were functionally equivalent to rights created by federal stat-
ute—like patent law—but did not serve the core policy goals of the federal law
in retaining access to the information to which exclusive rights are granted.  The
correct analysis of UCITA, insofar as Article I is concerned, is to consider
whether its blanket validation of mass-market licenses, including those that
prohibit users from making uses preserved for them by the Copyright Act, is
preempted by that Act, or conflicts with the requirements of Article I as
implemented in the Copyright Act.  In the case of UCITA, for example, valida-
tion of a shrinkwrap license that prohibits copying of public domain materials
covered by the contract would be a simple example of state law enforcement of
a term in a mass-market contract that could violate Article I as implemented
through the Copyright Act.  The Copyright Act implements access to public
domain materials in a variety of ways.143  It does so in many cases as a direct
implementation of Article I’s mandate not to create rights in public domain
materials.  When UCITA is enforced to circumvent these privileges, it does so
in violation of the constitutionally embedded federal policy just as surely as the
boat hull design considered in Bonito Boats violated federal patent policy.
Moreover, enforcement of mass-market shrinkwrap licenses to prohibit
users from using information in ways permissible under copyright law is gener-
ally a suppression of speech that must be reviewed under Turner.  That shrink-
wrap license enforcement is based in contract law about speech no more
insulates it from First Amendment review than the private law basis of defama-
tion law insulates it from complying with a federally imposed, constitutional
baseline.  When contract law refuses to enforce contracts that are against public
policy, it recognizes the irreducible public role in defining the conditions of
enforceability.  Just as the exclusive rights themselves are reviewable because
they seek to achieve a public purpose by prohibiting certain expressive acts, so
too contracts about permitted and prohibited expression call upon the state to
prohibit certain speech in pursuit of public policy.  The decision whether to
enforce contracts for gambling, or prostitution, or assassinations under the law,
was a public decision, aimed at public goals, with implications as to the
enforcement of a legal form of interpersonal agreements.  Similarly, the deci-
sion about whether to enforce contracts that determine whether one person will
say certain things or read certain things will be enforced under the law is a
public decision, implemented through public law.  That public decision is sub-
ject to review under the First Amendment.  Again, not every contract is subject
to de novo review.  Categories of policy decisions, however—such as whether to
enforce mass-market licenses that prohibit uses of information otherwise privi-
leged by copyright law—are subject to de novo review.
142. 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989).
143. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 992-94 (1990).
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The “public” character of the license is even less problematic when the
“contract” is not a negotiated agreement between equal parties, but a mass-
market license that is in effect a privately selected, but publicly enforced, regu-
lation of how certain information is used by wide ranges of the population.
When Congress creates a particular set of rules regulating access to information
or cultural materials, it determines that the means it adopted adequately serves
the goal of promoting incentives for creativity.  Given the political economy of
congressional legislation on exclusive private right in information, at any given
moment the federally enacted baseline is likely to be more protective than
optimal.  This baseline, the federal law of copyright, always stands as a less
restrictive alternative for attaining that goal than the terms a mass-market
vendor will add to that baseline.  The result is that a state law or court order
that prohibits a person from using information as the user is permitted to under
the Copyright Act is an overly restrictive regulation of that use.  A less restric-
tive alternative is readily available in the form of the federal baseline.
D. Regulating the Logical Layer: Code and the Constitution
Imagine a critic of Hollywood culture—say, a feminist film critic or a fun-
damentalist preacher—preparing a presentation about the ills he or she sees in
this culture.  The most effective means of explaining and communicating this
criticism would be a presentation laced with illustrations from actual films.  The
Copyright Act generally permits such quotations from video.  The DMCA
however, has created a framework that operates at the logical, or software
layer, and effectively prohibits these quotations.
The DMCA prohibits anyone from circumventing a technical measure that
controls access to a work.144  It also prohibits anyone from making or distribut-
ing utilities that would help users circumvent protection measures.145  Neither
provision, at least as currently interpreted, is subject to the fair use exception,
and the quotations by the feminist critic or the fundamentalist preacher would
not likely fall under any exception to the DMCA.  If producers encrypt cultural
products, as the film industry has done with DVDs and new videocassettes, it
becomes illegal under the DMCA to perform the functions at the logical layer
that are necessary to quote from them.146  A bill is presently being contemplated
to force manufacturers of both the physical and logical layers of the information
environment—the hard drives, computers, screens and the like, as well as soft-
ware—similarly to design their wares to enforce the licensing practices of the
copyright industry.147
144. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
145. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
146. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub
nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corely, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2001) (note that this case is
referred to as Reimerdes at the district court level and Corely on appeal).
147. Security Systems Standards and Certification Act [Draft], available at http://cryptome.org/sssca.
htm (Aug. 6, 2001).
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Some technical protection may be necessary to preserve the viability of a
commodified, copyright-based business model in cultural production. A perva-
sive rebuilding of both the infrastructure’s physical and logical layers designed
to control the way individuals interact with their cultural environment, how-
ever, undermines both individual expressive freedom and the richness of politi-
cal discourse.  In particular, these provisions make cultural resources less avail-
able and more expensive for the noncommodified sector—like the feminist film
critic or the fundamentalist preacher—thus, threatening to impoverish an
increasingly important dimension of social discourse.
Three cases that test the constitutionality of the DMCA’s anti-device provi-
sion have recently been considered.  These are Corely, Felten, and Sklyarov.
Corely presents the most substantial First Amendment decision.  Sklyarov
arises in the context of criminalization.  Felten is almost too easy a test, pre-
senting the real-world example of what would otherwise be considered a
“parade of horribles”-type argument.
Corely involves a suit by the eight Hollywood studios against a hacker
magazine, 2600, published by Eric Corely.  The plaintiffs sought an injunction
prohibiting 2600 from making available, or linking to other sites that make
available, a program called “DeCSS.”148  DeCSS is a computer program that cir-
cumvents the copy protection scheme, CSS, used to control access to DVDs.
CSS prevents copying or any use of DVDs unauthorized by the vendor.  DeCSS
was written by a fifteen-year-old Norwegian named Jon Johanson, who claims
(though the district court discounted his claim) to have written it as part of an
effort to create a DVD player for Linux based machines.149  2600 posted a copy
of DeCSS on its site, together with a story about it.  The industry obtained an
injunction against 2600 prohibiting not only the posting of DeCSS, but also its
links to other sites that post the program.150  The court rejected the defendant’s
arguments that sought to interpret the DMCA to include a fair use exception,
as well as the defendant’s constitutional argument that if the DMCA’s anti-
device provision prohibited DeCSS, then the DMCA was unconstitutional.151
The defendant presented the Court of Appeals with both an Article I argu-
ment and two types of First Amendment arguments against the DMCA.  The
Article I argument was that the limitations Article I places on Congress’s power
to grant exclusive private rights in information require, among other things, that
a law not remove materials from the public domain and that it provide protec-
tion only for limited times.152  Encryption, however, allows a vendor to encrypt
not only copyrighted materials, but also public domain materials never owned
by the copyright owner and materials whose term of protection has expired.
148. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09.
149. Id. at 311.
150. Id. at 312.
151. Id. at 332-33.
152. Julie Cohen, Brief of Amici IP Law Professors, at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/
MPAA_DVD_cases/20010126_ny_lawprofs_amicus.html (Jan. 26, 2001).
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Thus, a law that prohibits the existence of circumvention devices, even those
usable to reach public domain materials, is a law that excludes these materials
from the public domain, or indefinitely extends the term of protection, in viola-
tion of the constricts of Article I.  Furthermore, it is law, rather than technology
or private action that excludes access to the materials.  This is because counter-
technology (circumvention devices like DeCSS) is perfectly capable of enabling
users to use the public domain materials.  Therefore, only the law prohibiting
these devices causes the exclusion.  But, according to Article I, a law giving
exclusive rights to control access to information or cultural materials may not
include a right to indeterminately exclude others from either public domain or
copyrighted material.  If the court does not accept this argument, or some simi-
lar limitation on what Congress can indirectly achieve through regulating the
logical layer of the information environment, then, the argument goes, regula-
tions like the DMCA as a practical matter can obviate the Article I protections
of the public domain.
The defendants also advanced two First Amendment arguments—one for
strict scrutiny, the other for intermediate, or Turner-level scrutiny. 153  Accepting
that the purpose of encouraging commercial proprietary production of informa-
tion through creating exclusive rights is an important government interest,
Turner-level review questions whether the specific law burdens speech too
much.  The internal limitations in copyright law—like the fair use exception or
the privileged use of public domain materials—are constitutive mediating
devices permitting copyright law to comply with the constraints of the First
Amendment.  The anti-device provision of the DMCA in effect eliminates these
mediating devices by giving vendors of digitized materials complete, rather than
limited control over materials they encrypt.  The effective elimination of access
to video materials for purposes of quotation, or to materials no longer covered
by copyright, or to materials otherwise in the public domain imposes too heavy
a burden on the speech of users, particularly in the presence of less restrictive
alternatives.  Less restrictive alternatives include: imposing liability for infring-
ing uses of circumvention, requiring that access-protection devices permit statu-
torily defined fair uses, or allowing copy protection mechanisms that permit
first-, but not second-generation copying.154  Given the presence of less restric-
tive alternatives that Congress has used in similar circumstances, the DMCA
imposes too great a burden and should be found to violate the First Amend-
ment.
The district court below held that the Turner standard was in fact applicable
but that the harms to fair users were too remote and speculative to justify find-
ing the act unconstitutional on its face.155  In addition, the court found that the
153. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 327-28.
154. See ACLU et al., Brief of Amici Curiae, at http://www.aclu.org/court/corley.pdf (Jan. 26, 2001);
Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Brief of Amici, at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/
MPAA_DVD_cases/20010126_ny_2profs_amicus.html (Jan. 26, 2001); EFF Supplemental Letter Brief,
at http://www. eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA_DVD_cases/20010530_ny_eff_supl_brief.html (May 30, 2001).
155. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327-37.
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specific defendants were not fair users and could not claim therefore to invali-
date the act as applied.156  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals largely upheld
the lower court’s decision.157  It, too, applied Turner scrutiny, and found the
DMCA to be sufficiently narrowly tailored given the perceived threat to copy-
right holders.158  It did not disagree with the arguments that there were less
restrictive means available but held that government need not use the least
restrictive means.
The lion’s share of the briefs and the opinions, both at the appellate and dis-
trict court level, were devoted to regulation of code as itself the regulation of
speech.  Following the district court, the court of appeals accepted that code
was a language that computer scientists used to communicate with each other,
finding that “programmers communicating ideas to one another almost inevita-
bly communicate in code, much as musicians use notes.”159  The court further
added in a footnote, “[r]einforcing the conclusion that software programs qual-
ify as ‘speech’ for First Amendment purposes—even though they instruct com-
puters—is the accelerated blurring of the line between ‘source code’ and con-
ventional ‘speech.’  There already exist programs capable of translating English
descriptions of a program into source code.”160  The court then rejected, how-
ever, the appellants’ view that this speech nature of code required strict scrutiny
of the DMCA.
Unlike a blueprint or a recipe, which cannot yield any functional result without human
comprehension of its content, human decision-making and human action, computer
code can instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and instantly render the
results of those tasks available throughout the world via the Internet.  The only human
action required to achieve these results can be as limited and instantaneous as a single
click of a mouse.  These realities of what code is and what its normal functions are
require a First Amendment analysis that treats code as combining nonspeech and
speech elements, i.e. functional and expressive elements.161
The court then quoted extensively from the lower court’s opinion, which
described how the functionality of DeCSS was to permit free and easy copying
of instantaneous perfect worldwide distribution, concluding that this function-
ality properly affects the scope of First Amendment protection, “the capacity of
a decryption program like DeCSS to accomplish unauthorized—indeed, unlaw-
ful—access to materials in which the Plaintiffs have intellectual property rights
must inform and limit the scope of it First Amendment protection.”162  This logic
eventually led the court to apply intermediate scrutiny, under which it found the
DMCA’s application to DeCSS unconstitutional.
The fundamental concern of the Second Circuit is, in my opinion, the proper
one.  Computer programs can indeed perform functions by being applied to
156. See id. at 323.
157. Corely, 273 F.3d at 429.
158. Id. at 454-55.
159. Id. at 448.
160. Id. at n.23.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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machines without human cognitive intervention, in a way that instructions of
how to build a bomb published in a magazine cannot.  Yet if law had said that
musicians may not use notes to exchange ideas about militaristic nationalism
because such music incites to violence through some primal mechanism not in
cognition, there would be no question that the regulation would be subject to
strict scrutiny.
If, instead of copyright and computer code, the law had said one may not
speak in Russian about overthrowing the U.S. government or in Arabic about
Jihad, the need for strict scrutiny would have been obvious.  Nothing in either
the change of language or the change of topic should result in a different out-
come.  It is still the case that there is an identifiable group of people for whom
use of a specific language is particularly helpful.  It is still the case that there are
particular topics the government believes are more dangerously spoken about
in some languages than in others.  This governmental judgment needs to be
subjected to strict scrutiny.  Perhaps a court today will decide that under the
Brandenburg test, prohibiting the sale of flight manuals in Arabic is justified.
Yet, in doing so a court would be required to utilize strict scrutiny, not some
lesser standard.  The repeated references in the Second Circuit’s opinion to the
threat DeCSS posed to Hollywood were inappropriate in considering the stan-
dard of review.  They would only have been appropriate to consider whether
the DMCA is valid under the higher standard of review.
From the perspective of First Amendment doctrine, the potential difficulty
is that no regulation of computer programming can be undertaken unless it
complies with the strict scrutiny standard.  That is not, in principle, an implausi-
ble result.  Journalists generally cannot be regulated in terms of the words they
use, except under strict scrutiny.  Why couldn’t the same be true of computer
programmers?
As the Second Circuit noted, the most important potential concern with this
outcome is that a communication to a machine intended to cause it to perform a
function is not a communication that triggers the First Amendment.  No one
would suggest that it is unconstitutional to regulate communication between a
human and a urinal achieved through an infrared port or communication
between a human and a remote-control car.  The complicating fact with code is
that the same words can be uttered, and some or even many human beings will
understand them as meaningful human communications, while some machines
will understand them as instructions.  The difficulty is how to regulate utter-
ances intended to “push buttons” without burdening human communications.
This might mean that executing a program must be distinguished from commu-
nicating it in a humanly readable form capable of being either read by a human
or run by a machine.  It might mean that distribution with the intent of running,
as opposed to that of communicating, should be more readily regulable.  The
obvious difficulty, once one presents the distinction in these terms, is the poten-
tial chilling effect on human communication.  This is exemplified most clearly
by David Touretsky’s superb website, devoted to prodding the boundaries of
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this precise problem.163  Touretsky presents various forms of describing DeCSS,
some more readily machine-readable than others.  He presents it, for example,
in plain English and in Haiku form, as well as in a computer language for which
a compiler has not yet been written.  Therefore, a machine could theoretically
read it, but the computer translation mechanism does not yet exist.
This kind of richly detailed argument is provocative.  It does not, however,
necessarily imply that software can never be regulated except under conditions
that would permit the regulation of a news report.  Journalists cannot have an
effect on the world through their writing, except through the acts of human
readers absorbing their words and opinions.  Regulating the words of journalists
is therefore regulating directly the human interaction that lies at the core of
both the democracy and the autonomy concerns of the First Amendment.  In
contrast, computer scientists writing code can have an effect on the world even
if no human being ever reads their work.  It seems plausible that the state
should be able to regulate those aspects of code distribution that are intended
to operate without operating on the human cognition.
Touretsky’s argument is, therefore, in large measure a well-presented, finely
detailed, slippery slope argument.164  It suggests that some cases will be easier,
and others harder.  Liability for sending an executable file of a virus, intended
to function on the computer of a user without communicating to the user,
should be relatively straightforward to understand in First Amendment terms as
not implicating expressive values.  In contrast, liability for publishing an aca-
demic paper that includes instructions for how to attain a certain result in com-
puting should be treated as implicating First Amendment interests of the high-
est order.  The presence of formal representations normally used in the
discipline, which are machine-readable and sufficient to be automatically com-
piled into running code, should not change this characterization.  This is why
the Felten case is so compelling, and why even though it implicated the same
threats as Corely, the court plainly would have been required to find the
DMCA unconstitutional.  This is probably why the recording industry ran away
from the field in it and settled the case.  In between there are hard cases that
need to be resolved on the basis of the extent to which a regulation burdens
speech among computer professionals.  Thus, a law that prohibits distribution of
source code (as defined functionally in the GNU General Public License
(“GPL”) to be the form most usable by programmers)165 should be treated as
directly burdening speech.  If it treats code about different human actions dif-
ferently because government treats communication in this form about this sub-
ject as more dangerous to its interests, as the DMCA anti-device provision
does, it should be seen as content-based speech regulation.  This is why the
163. David Touretsky, Gallery of CSS Descramblers, at http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/
Gallery/index.html (last modified Aug. 29, 2002).  In principle, the logic of linking liability in the
DeCSS case could treat this footnote as an act of trafficking (though this is unlikely).
164. Id.
165. GNU GPL § 3, available at http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/library.txt (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modifications to it.
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DMCA, which treats uncompiled sources of code and object code alike, should
have been treated as content-based speech regulation and struck down.  A law
that prohibits only the distribution of executable files already compiled for a
known set of machines, should be seen as incidentally affecting speech, and
subject to O’Brien review.166  I do not pretend that this cursory discussion
resolves this issue.  Here I only raise this difficult question, and suggest my own
intuitions about this thorny question.
E. Criminalization
The DMCA and regulation of the logical layer is also where the story of
Dmitry Sklyarov enters and looms large.167  Encryption of information and cul-
tural materials is intimately involved in the denial of permission to read, view,
or quote the encrypted materials.  A legal prohibition on decryption—on taking
practical steps that would allow one to read, view, or quote the information or
cultural materials regardless of the prohibition—directly implicates First
Amendment considerations.  To impose criminal sanctions in this delicate area
is to force innovators and readers to adopt wide margins around the contours of
the law.  The high risk of criminal liability and its chilling effect on protected
activities requires courts to be especially wary of criminal provisions that
burden speech.  It is one thing for Alice Randall, Edward Felten or 2 Live Crew
to test the bounds of the law when the consequences might be an injunction
preventing publication or a damage award.  It is quite another to ask them to
continue to enrich our speech environment at the risk of spending years in a
federal prison.
Beginning with the No Electronic Theft Act (“NET Act”)168 and later incor-
porated into the DMCA,169 criminal copyright recently has greatly expanded.
Prior to passage of the NET Act, only commercial pirates—those that slavishly
made thousands or millions of copies of video or audiocassettes and sold them
for profit—would have qualified as criminal violators of copyright.  With the
passage of the NET Act, criminal liability has been expanded to cover private
copying and free sharing of copyrighted materials whose cumulative nominal
price, irrespective of actual displaced demand, is quite low.  As criminal copy-
right law is currently written, many individuals involved with the over tens of
millions of peer-to-peer file sharing systems are felons.  It is one thing when in
an effort to conform social norms to their business model the recording industry
labels tens of millions of individuals in a society as “pirates.”  It is quite another
when the state brands these individuals as felons and fines or imprisons them.
166. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
167. See supra, Part I.B.
168. Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1997).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 204.
BENKLER_FMT(3).DOC 03/20/03  3:41 PM
Winter/Spring 2003] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 217
Jessica Litman has offered the most plausible explanation of the criminaliza-
tion phenomenon.170  She argues that as networking makes low-cost production
and exchange of information and culture easier, large-scale commercial produc-
ers are faced with a new source of competition—volunteers, people who pro-
vide information and culture for free.171  As the universe of people who can
threaten the industry has grown to encompass almost all potential customers,
the plausibility of using civil actions to force individuals to buy rather than share
information decreases.  Suing all of one’s customers is not a sustainable business
model.  In an effort to maintain their business model, which relies on control
over information goods and their sale as products, the copyright industry has
enlisted criminal enforcement.  By doing so, commercial producers prevent the
emergence of such a system of free exchange.  In Sklyarov, this is illustrated by
the fact that Adobe instigated the prosecution.  Even though Adobe later
receded in the face of the outrage of many of its customers, it does not change
the fundamental fact that it instigated precisely the chain of events that it
wished would occur—criminal enforcement without direct involvement by the
vendor.
The changes in law, coupled with the Justice Department’s current focus on
enforcement of intellectual property rights,172 have lead to a substantial increase
in the likelihood of criminal enforcement.  The potential stakes of using infor-
mation and cultural materials have risen.  Now users are required to seek a
license and pay for use in many more instances than they would have only a few
years ago.173  It is still, as of this writing, a serious constitutional question
whether a law like the DMCA, that prohibits Dmitry Sklyarov from writing
code that has substantial noninfringing uses—such as letting users read public
domain materials like Alice in Wonderland or quote from e-books without per-
mission—is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under Article I or is consistent
with the First Amendment.  Asking programmers to write the software that will
make these privileged uses available, so that legal challenges can determine the
constitutionality of that prohibition is difficult when the price of a mistake is
imprisonment.
The Supreme Court has expressed particular concern with the chilling effect
of criminal, as opposed to civil, enforcement of policy.  In Reno v. ACLU, the
Court specifically stated that “the severity of criminal sanctions may well cause
speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful
words, ideas, and images,”174 distinguishing it from the civil measures used to
effectuate similar child-protection goals in Denver Area Educational Telecom-
170. See Jessica Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, 1 J. ETH. & INFO. TECH. 213 (1999),
available at http://www.law.wayne.edu/litman/papers/freespeech.pdf.
171. Id.
172. See DOJ Intellectual Property Policy and Programs, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/
cybercrime/ippolicy.htm (last modified July 20, 2001).
173. See supra Part IV.C.
174. 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
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munications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.175  Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion the court’s approval of the FCC’s administrative action specifically noted as
one consideration that the sanction imposed was not criminal.176
The thoughtful critical essay that David Touretsky has published includes
materials that could be interpreted as circumvention devices; providing them
could be interpreted as trafficking.177  The problem with the expansive criminali-
zation of copyright is that Touretsky must be a braver man to bring his criticism
to the public than he would need to be if the sole remedy were civil—say an
injunction requiring him to remove his web page following time-wasting and
costly litigation.  Some brave critics will continue.  Others will be chilled.  Dis-
course, however, will undoubtedly be impoverished.
Given the tremendous expansion of rights in the past few years, and the
serious arguments that these expansions have deleterious implications for free
speech and are unjustified as a matter of economic theory, the heightened
criminalization of copyright should present an immediate target for judicial
review.  The Sklyarov case presents an excellent opportunity for the judiciary to
exercise its moderating power.
F. Raw Information and Information about Information
In 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the
Supreme Court held that raw facts in a compilation or database were not cov-
ered by the Copyright Act, and could not be protected consistent with the con-
straints imposed by the Exclusive Rights Clause.178  The Court held that the
creative element of the compilation—for example, its organization or selectiv-
ity—could be protected under copyright law.179  The facts compiled, however,
could not be protected.180  Copying data from an existing compilation was there-
fore not “piracy”; it was not unfair or unjust; it was purposefully privileged in
order to advance the goals of exclusive rights—the advancement of progress
and creative uses of the data.181
In the years since the Court decided Feist, there have been repeated efforts
by the larger players in the database publishing industry to pass legislation that
would, as a practical matter, overturn Feist and create exclusive private rights in
the raw data in compilations.182 Since the Court rooted its Feist decision in a
robust interpretation of the Exclusive Rights Clause, efforts to protect database
providers eventually settled on an unfair competition law. Based in the Com-
merce Clause, protections under unfair competition law are free and clear of
175. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
176. 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978).
177. Touretsky, supra note 163.
178. 499 U.S. at  349-50.
179. Id. at 350-51; 17 U.S.C. § 103.
180. Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
181. Id. at 349-50.
182. The Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act (CIAA) H.R. 354, 106th Cong (1999).
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the inconvenient weight of Feist.  In reality, however, the primary law that has
repeatedly been introduced walks, talks, and looks like a property right.183  If
some version of this law ultimately passes, it will present an important focal
point for defining the constitutional status of raw data, under both the Exclusive
Rights Clause and the First Amendment.
Even if the congressional law may be stopped, however, other avenues have
recently opened to appropriate raw data.  In particular, some litigants have
turned to state law remedies to protect their data indirectly, by developing a
trespass-to-server form of action. The primary instance of this trend is eBay,
Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., a suit by the leading Internet auction site against an
aggregator site.184  Aggregators collect information about what is being auc-
tioned in multiple locations, and make them available in one place so that a user
can simultaneously search eBay,185 Yahoo,186 and other auction sites.  The even-
tual bidding itself is done on whatever site the item’s owner chooses to make his
or her item available, under whatever terms are imposed by that site.  The court
in eBay held that the automated information collection process—the process of
running a computer program that continuously requests information from the
server about what is listed on it, called a “spider” or a “bot”—was a trespass to
chattels.187  The injunction led to Bidder’s Edge closing its doors before the
Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to review the decision.188
Decisions like eBay create an exclusive private right in information under
the common law.  While, in principle, the information is still free of property
rights, reading it mechanically, which is an absolute necessity given the volume
of the information and its storage on magnetic media, can be prohibited as tres-
pass.  The practical result would be equivalent to some aspects of a federal
exclusive private right in raw data, but without the mitigating attributes of any
exceptions that would be directly introduced into legislation.  To prevent such
an eventuality, if these cases cannot be won on state common law grounds, they
must be challenged either on preemption grounds—based on the copyright
law—or on First Amendment grounds—using the model of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.189  The preemption approach could be similar to the model fol-
lowed by the Second Circuit in NBA v. Motorola.190  In Motorola the court
restricted state misappropriation claims to narrow bounds delimited by the fed-
eral policy embedded in the Copyright Act.191  Perhaps requiring actual proof
that the bots have stopped service, or that they threaten the very existence of
183. Id.
184. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
185. http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
186. http://auctions.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
187. Ebay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069.
188. Peg Brickley, Now-Defunct Bidder’s Edge Settles Online Dispute, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES,
July 2001, at 70.
189. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
190. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
191. Id. at 850.
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the service—a requirement imposed, mutatis mutandis in Motorola—would be
sustainable under a First Amendment or preemption analysis.
Beyond raw data and the various ways of controlling it, a central question
that will have to be addressed is the status of legal control of information about
information—like linking, or other statements people make about the avail-
ability and valence of some described information.  Linking—the mutual
pointing of many documents to each other—is the very core idea of the World
Wide Web.  In a variety of cases, parties have attempted to use law to control
the linking practices of others.  These efforts have largely been an effort to
retain control over the information about which the challenged link provides
information.  What is common to these cases is that they aim to create an exclu-
sive private right to give people information about where they can find
information. The linking aspect of Reimerdes directly raises this exclusive right
argument as an interpretation of the anti-device provision of the DMCA.192
In Reimerdes, the movie industry sought and received an injunction prohib-
iting defendants from linking their site to places on the Internet where users
could access DeCSS.193  The district court concluded that the defendants were
prohibited from telling others where copies of DeCSS were available.194  It con-
cluded that providing a link to an online distribution point was the virtual
equivalent to giving it on a disk.195  The court argued that a link is just another
way to make the prohibited software available to users, thus violating the pro-
hibition on trafficking in circumvention devices.196  The district court found this
analysis straightforward where the link directly began a downloading process.197
It was not as clear-cut where a general-purpose publication, like a newspaper,
linked to a broad site that discussed many issues, and included a link to a copy
of the program.  The court found its decision harder in instances where there
was some material on the end of a link, but not much other than the prohibited
circumvention software.198  Similarly, the court found it important that the
person linking had intended to facilitate circumvention by linking.199  As a result,
the court set out a sliding scale of likelihood of finding liability.  The scale
depended on the intent of the linking and the extent to which a link was close
to, or removed from, being a download button in practice.200  The Court of
Appeals largely accepted this analysis, and, indeed, refused to hold that the test
might not be even less constraining.
The difficulty with the district court’s approach in Reimerdes is that linking
is simply a statement about where information can be found.  Prohibiting
192. See Universal Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 339-41(S.D.N.Y. 2000)
193. Id. at 341.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 324.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 325.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 324-25.
200. Id. at 340-41.
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people from telling other people where information can be found, while leaving
them free to use that information as they please is very difficult to square with
the First Amendment.  A list of links is not fundamentally different from a
newspaper listing of all the bookstores in town where pornography can be
found.  The “intent” factor the district court used to mitigate this effect would
have allowed imposition of liability against a publication that intended to help
its readers obtain pornography, but would have exempted a conservative news-
paper that published the list as part of a campaign to boycott the stores.  The
general-purpose publication versus dedicated distribution site factor may have
meant that if a publication had enough other content it would not be liable, but
a person handing out handbills with the same exact list would be liable.  This
degree of ex post judicial judgment as to intent and purpose of the publication
would chill speech.  Perhaps, under a clear and present danger analysis, some
links can indeed be prohibited.  For example, a link that, without warning the
person clicking, begins to download a virus without the intervention of human
cognition is a fairly obvious example of a link that could be prohibited.  Such a
link plays a purely functional, not communicative role.  If, however, you are
linked to a site that has such a link, particularly with some statement—”you can
find this virus here”—it is then a matter providing information, not of causing
harm.
A more subtle regulation of linking occurs when parties seek either to pro-
hibit others from linking to them or to control how others do so.  The quintes-
sential case involved a service that Microsoft offered—sidewalk.com.201  This
service provided access to, among other things, information on events in various
cities.  If a user wanted a ticket to an event, the sidewalk site linked that user
directly to a page on ticketmaster.com where the user could buy a ticket.  Tick-
etmaster objected to this practice, preferring instead that sidewalk.com link to
its home page.202  Linking to the Ticketmaster home page would ensure user
exposure to all of the advertising and services Ticketmaster provides, rather
than solely to the specific service the user sought after being referred by side-
walk.com.  This case settled.  Another similar case, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tick-
ets.com, Inc., was resolved in an unpublished opinion that focused on other
aspects of the case.203
At stake in these linking cases is who will control the context in which cer-
tain information is presented.  If deep linking is prohibited, Ticketmaster will
control the context.  They will control the other movies or events available to be
seen, their relative prominence, reviews, and similar information.  The right to
control linking then becomes a right to shape the meaning and relevance of
one’s statements for others.  Although the choice between Ticketmaster and
Microsoft as controllers of the context of information may seem of little norma-
201. See Michael Newman, Ticketmaster vs. Microsoft is Bully Battle, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
May 18, 1997, at C-3.
202. http://ticketmaster.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
203. No. CV99-7654-HLH (BQRx) 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).
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tive consequence, it is important to recognize that the right to control linking
could easily apply to a local library, or church, or a neighbor.
On the Internet, there are a variety of ways that people can provide infor-
mation about materials elsewhere on the Web.  In doing so, they loosen some-
one else’s control over the information—be it the government, a third party
interested in limiting access to the information described, or the person offering
the information described.  In a series of instances we have seen people attempt
to limit the ability of others to loosen their control by providing information
about the specified information.  These are not cases in which a person without
access to information seeks affirmative access.  Rather, these are cases where
someone seeks the aid of law to control what others say to each other about the
controlled information.  Understood in these terms, the restrictive implications
of these moves for free speech become clear.  In turn, the need to subject them
to First Amendment scrutiny is obvious.
V
CONCLUSION
Exclusive private rights in information exist in tension with individual free-
dom to read and express oneself.  This tension is mediated by constitutional
constraints placed on Congress when it enacts such rights, constitutional con-
straints that in practice some lower courts have relaxed.
The constraints are justified because overly strong exclusive private rights in
information entail substantial costs for democracy and autonomy.  The driving
mechanism from both a democracy and autonomy perspective is that strong
exclusive rights increase the importance of large-scale commercial producers of
commodified information.  This is at the expense of both nonprofit information
production and the emergence of nonproprietary, peer production as core ele-
ments of our information production system.  For democracy, that means that
more of the available information and the channels of communication are fun-
neled through a small number of large commercial media companies.  This cur-
tails the opportunities for a more diverse universe of content and loci of dis-
course.  For autonomy, it means that we will have a system with substantially
less information of critical and fringe possibilities, and greater opportunities for
some players—the owners of media and “content”—to structure the informa-
tion environment of consumers.  It also means that opportunities for enhancing
personal autonomy in both the productive and consumption aspects of indi-
viduals’ lives—opportunities made possible by the emergence of peer produc-
tion—will be more limited.
The constraints are also explained by the fact that the political economy of
legislation in this field has a systematic bias towards ever-stronger exclusive
rights.  The beneficiaries of the rights see private and present gains from
strengthening rights.  Those who bear the costs are diffuse.  Usually, also, the
costs are to be incurred in the future, sometimes by generations not yet born or
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at least not yet able to foresee the effects on them. This leads to a systematic
overstatement of the benefits and understatement of the costs of rights.
At present, a number of pressure points are likely to play a central role in
defining the relationship between the Constitution and the institution of exclu-
sive private rights in information.  First, the framework I suggest is controver-
sial.  Whether it will end up reflecting the law will largely be determined in a
number of cases currently in the courts, in particular Eldred.
Second, the way the First Amendment plays in this debate will be heavily
affected by how First Amendment law resolves an internal tension in respond-
ing to the rise of the information economy.  The First Amendment’s gradual
extension of rights to corporations, and of the status of speech to what are
essentially the commercial operations of firms in the information economy,
pushes towards a new-Lochnerism for the information economy.  The simulta-
neous failure to protect individuals from commercial overreaching that
impoverishes and controls individuals’ information environment introduces a
moral inversion in First Amendment law.  The First Amendment has come to
protect as central rights that can only be justified instrumentally.  This is often
at the expense of individuals who are the real bearers of intrinsic claims to free-
dom of speech and expression.
Third, this is an area in which the form of many of the regulations has the
look and feel of private ordering, a characteristic that tends to confound First
Amendment law.  Nonetheless, the design of exclusive private rights should be
treated as any other law whose operative characteristic is the prohibition of
speech.
Fourth, how we resolve the First Amendment status of the regulation of
code will be immensely important.  It will determine how the logical layer of the
information environment is made to comply with, or resist, enclosure of the
public domain.  The increasing sophistication of computers and the ease of
translation from human to machine languages significantly complicates this
problem.
Fifth, heightened criminalization raises the stakes of the constitutional
debate.  It presents one of the most important needs for immediate resolution.
Sixth, a variety of mechanisms being developed to give some people power
to control the information that other people give about particular information is
an area where the First Amendment has an important role to play.  It should
stem the expanding range of rights to control information that are intended to
sustain the business model of selling information as goods.
What is up for grabs in these debates is the way that information and culture
is produced in the pervasively networked society.  How information is produced
and used, who engages in information production and exchange, with what
motives and with what degree of control over what others see and speak in
society, will have significant implications for democracy and freedom.  The
Constitution cannot be silent or neutral in answering these questions.  It places
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its thumb on the scales of freedom on the side of a robust democratic discourse,
of diversity of antagonistic voices, and of individual expressive autonomy.
